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Laird v. Tatum 
Cert to CA DC: Tamm, Wilkey; dissenting: tlacKiQQQQ 
This suit was filed almost two years ago by a number of 
citizens and organizations connected with political causes, 
primarily in opposition to the war in Somth East Asia. The 
complaint alleged that resps, the Secy of Defense, et al., 
were engaged in the surveilance of «xxix~N«R civilians engaged 
in peaceful political activities. s~mex~f All of resps believed 
that they had been under surveilance, and some of them knew so, 
as an attached document demonstrated. It was alleged that 
this xx surve~nce and the keeping of records, including a 
so-called blacklist of persons who "might cause trouble for 
-2-
the Army" was widely circulated and was stored in a computerized 
data bank. It was further alleged that the defendants planned 
to mkx make the data available to x other federal agencies. 
Finally, it was alleged that the purpose and effect of all 
this was the harassment and intimidation of plaintiffs in order 
to deter them from exercising their 1st Amendment rights XN 
of political expression, ~N protest and dissent from government 
policies. This harassment was XN~~NX~Nx~ invading the plaintiffs' 
privacy, damaging their reputations, adversely affecting their 
Rm~N employment and their opportunities for employment. 
This was said to deprive plaintiffs of their rights to free speech 
XN and association the right to petition the govt for redress of 
~x~ grievances, and ther right of privacy guaranteed an protected 
by the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 9th Amendments. The surveilance 
program was alleged to E exceed the lawful needs of the Army 
and to be without statutory authority. Plaintiffs sued on behalf 
of all other similarly situtated. The~ought a declarat?ry 
judgment XRX that Army surveilance of lawful political activity 
was unconstitutional; preliminary and permanent injunctions 
against spying and maintaining records about the lawful political 
activites of plaitiffs; a mandatory injuntion ordering the 
defs to produce all records before the court so that they could 
be destroyed; and a premanent injuntion forbidding plaintiffs 
from xxx attaching security classification to any of these 
records. 




petr here, moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state 
~ a cause of action. The case came before Judge Hart on motion 
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as well as on the motion for a preliminary injuction. In 
connection with the latter motion, the govt put in affidavits 
about the extent of surveilance of civilians by Army Intelligence, 
but no testimony was taken despite the resps offer of ~~xx 
proof. Instead, Judge Hart ruled from the bench that the 
information MXX that the Army was £~m~xxxE~m~x compiling was 
readily available through the news media; that resps showed 
(""\ 
no unconstitutional acti:n; and that they showed no threafs 
to their rights. The moftion to dismiss was granted. 
Resps appealed to CA DC 'l.vhich reversed Judge Hart, Judge 
MacKinnon dissenting. The court of appeals ruled that resps 
had made out a cause of action by alleging that the existence 
of the surveilance machinery chilled the 1st Amendment r~hts 
of resps and the members of their class. Since ~ resps were 
alleged to be spied on, the court held that they had standing 
to make the claimJ The £~~M court ordered that the case be 
remanded to the district court so that the court could determine 
the nature of the domestic intelligence system, what part of 
the system was unrelated to or not reasonably necessary to the 
performance of the Army's function, and whether the overb~d 
aspects of the system have an inhibiting effect on resps. 
The govt sought cert from that decision, which was granted. 
Although~ other facts are thrown about in the briefs by 
all sides, the only relevant facts for the purposes of this 
case at this juncture are those alleged in the complaint which 
must be taken as true. Allegations about the extent of the 
surveilance as a result of a recent order is not x~i~XRRHXX 
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recognizable or relevant at this time. Thus, the Court must 
accept as true the axRx allegations of resps that the Army has 
engaged in the surveilance of civilcitans engaged in legitimate 
political activity, that this surveilance is neither necessary 
to xkei::x the Army's legitimate funtions nor authorized by law, 
16-t-
and that the effect of th~s is to chill the exercise of x ~ 
Amendment rights and invade the privacy of resps. the question 
before the Court is, assuming that all those things are true, 
can resps assert these rights at this time. 
Petrs assert first that the claim put forth by resps is 
not_justi~iaQle in the XRRXXR sense that the issues raised may 
n~ properly be considered by a court. Justiciability is based -on the need to limit disputes to cases that are presented in 
an adversary context in a way capable of resolution through 
the judicial process and on the Constitutional doctrine of 
seperation of powers. Resps are said to allege only a general 
invasion of privacy, {mage to their reputations, and adverse 
effects on employment; they cite no specific examples. Thus, 
their claims are not concrete enough to be justiciable. Nor 
are the assertions enough to justify the «~Nx:Kx~ courts' 
intervening in the actions of the President and Congress. 
There is no assertion that criminal sanctions have resulted, 
that any of resps have been «~m~x compelled to disclose their 
political beliefs or ideas, or that the collected information 
has ERRRN been misuea--factors that have been present in other 
chilling effect cases. Even when a chilling effect is alleged, 
there must be a focus on an actual effect of a program not on 
xix -5-
a general objection to it. If this case is justiciable, petrs 
argue that the case and controversy requirement is out the 
window. Resps should rely on Congressional supervision of 
this executive function, not on judicial supervision. 
Resps argue that there is nothing hypothetical about 
their complaint; they allege that they themselves have been 
" under survei~lance x~ 
dossiers. The system 
and are the subject of records and 
is operating ; it is not a hypothetical 
system ~fxxxgex or a general policy not yet put into effect. 
~exxx Resps have alleged that the Army's policy abuses the 
freedoms of all Americans and that it has particular applicaton 
to them. \\7h.ile the govt argues that resps were not chilled 
because they instituted this suit, it has never been the policy 
of this Court in first amendment areas to find no justiciability 
because somone with even a greater injury might sue. The First 
Amendment is too important. So important, that special principles 
have developed which enable a litigant to secure early protection 
of a first amendment right without waiting until he has been 
directly subjected to the force of the law. If it is alleged 
that the ~eate of the law prevents the exercise of 1st amendment 
rights, than there is a judiciable controversy. Such a chilling 
effect has been noted in other case when a law required compulsory 
disclosure of xx~ associates, when the threat of a xxNxsanction 
resulted in censorship, when reg istration f~x causing political 
and 
identifcation was required,jwhen x~g~ loyalty oaths that could 
inhibit joining political groups were required, The chilling 
effect in those cases was no more conceete than the chilling 
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effect here. In those cases, the plaintiffs had not be chi1~d 
to the extent that they were unwilling to litigate. Yet 
justiciability was found. Social science supports the fact 
that a chilling effect results from activities such as those 
alleged in the brief, RH~ but if the Court is not sure, the -
correct result is to remand for the hearing to see if there 
was in fact a chilling effect, 
In addition, resps have alleged that their privacy was 
unjustly invaded by the actions of the Army. There can be 
no question that some of them suffered such an invasion in 
the sense that they were the subjects of surveilance and dossiers. 
They are entitled to a hearing on their privacy allegations 
even if the chilling effect on 1st amendment rights which 
they allege is not concrete enough. 
As a second argument, petrs claim that the resps had no 
standing to bring this suit. The injury that is alleged by 
the named plaintiffs is not a personal inury but an injury 
to others. By ~Rxxx resps own admission, they were not chilled 
in the exercise of their 1st Amendment rights or else they 
would not have brought this litigation. While Congress may 
have power to confer jurisdiction to someone to serve as a 
private attorney general to ~ advance the xxxN rights of another, 
it has not done so in this area. And even if Congress had so 
acted, the NRMRN~ named plaintiffs must have something more 
than a general interest held by the pulic as a whole. If 
the complaint is based on future injury, there is still not 
any standing because the hypothetical possilbity is not definite 
enough. 
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Resps argue that petrs never raised the issue of standing 
iRxxkiKxfsxm below and that it is not properly raised for the 
first time in this Court. There must only be a logical connection 
between the party who is suing and the issue he seeks to raise 
for xk2ixxx there to be standing in federal court. Such a 
nexus exists here because petrs allege that they are among the 
individuals and organizations who are subject to surveilance. 
Moreover, resps specifically alleged that their 1st amendment 
rights were being chilled and that their privacy was being 
invaded. The statement in oral argument that they were not 
chilled was directed only to the bringing s~x of this suit. 
The fact that the effect was not so great as to intimidate them 
~ from bringing the suit does not mean that there is no effect 
at all or that there are not some kinds of expression in which 
they will not engage because of the chilling effect of surveilance. 
Moreover, as individuals and organizations engaged in political 
activites, their interests are involved if they cannot XKK 
persuade others to join, attend meetings, or othe~wise associate 
with ~ resps because of the chilling effect of surveilance. 
If you accept the govt's position that anyone who comes forward 
to challenge the constitutionality of surveilance cannot be 
intimidated by it, than you have to conclude that xk2xxx~ 
there can never be a suit challenging a practice on theg ground 
that it chills speech unitl after a person has spoken and somehow 
been punished. But the Court has recognized on numerous occasions 
that a person has standing before he is punished because fax 
failure to x~~ speak is the harm to be prevented. Resps therefpre 
have a special interest in the interest and the interest they 
- 8]-
assert is ~xNXR within the x~NNR zone of interests protected 
by the 1st Amendment. Finally , since it is alleged and must 
be accepted for purposes of this case that the surveilance is 
beyond the scope of official authority, standing should exist. 
The Court has recognized the rule that standing is more likely 
to exist when xxKNxxeixaN the action challenged is not authorized. 
And kf of course, there is no question that resps have a direct 
interest intheir own privacy which they allege has been abridged. 
Any discussion of the concept of justiciability and 
standing must begin with the Court's N~N opinion in ~last_y~ 
.Qohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), which upheld the standing of plaintiffs 
as taxpayers to challengean act of Congress authorizing expenditures 
of funds on the ground that those funds we would violate the 
1st Amendment guarantee against establishment of religion. 
In part III of that opinion, the Court discussed the concept 
f '~ . . b. 1. \ o JUSt~ca ~ ~ty. It traced two XNNgx roots to the doctrine. 
(I)First, the doctrine limits the business of federal courts to 
quest ions presented in an adversary context and in RXXNXM a ; " 
form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the 
judicial process.~econd, it reflects the limited role of the 
courts in the federal scheme of seperation of powers. The 
Court then went on to indicate what kinds of things had been 
held to be non-justiciable--a tactic probably necessitated by 
the amorphus qulaity of the concept. There is no jasticiable 
question when the parties seek to litigate a political question. 
The term "polictical question" was discussed more fully in 
Powell v. McCormack , 395 U .S. 486 (1969), in which the Court 
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indicated that it meant a question committed by the Constitution 
to another branch of the government to resolve. Surely, that is 
not the case here since the guestion raises issues of Speech and 
Privacy ~2~Nxaxxx peculiarly committed by the Constitution to 
.............. ,.,. 
judicial resolution. A ~NXX~K political question would be a - -question such as KR!RNK!RX which o/¥J.d iEl.a te xaxi:xfi~&xxxbi!R should 
be seated in the Senate, because ~icle I , Sec 5, gives the 
Senate exclusive power to make such determinations. 
Secondly, no advisory opinion can be justiciable; but 
---
clearly none is sought here. No one denies that the parties 
are generally antagonistic toward one another. Certainly 
resps have as great as antagonistic position to the government 
as that of the taxpayers in Flast--Y!_ Cohen. Third, the Court 
will not consider moot questions, but mootness is not argu.§d 
here. Even if the case were moot, that is a factual question 
which the district court would have to resolve after hearing 
the evidence about the Army's new practices.aNNXaNNNXXKN 
Fourth "N!RN!R where there x is no standing, there is no justiciab_l~ 
question. This is, I suggest, the heart of the case for the 
government because all of their justiciablilty arguments are 
__..... ..... 
really standing arguments. 
Essentially , the government 's brief relies on only two 
points. First , that the chilling effect alleged by ~ resps 
was not specific enough, and second, that any injury alleged 
was alleged to others, not to resps. Those points, I think 
go really to standing, as the concept was explained in Flast 
and in Data Process ing Service v. Ca~, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
. 
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In Flast, the Court said that standing presented the question 
of whether the plaintiff "is a proper party to request ami 
11 t'·( 'to 
adjudication of a particular issue and~ whether the issue 
itself is justiciable." In this case, whether resps have alleged 
a specific enough injury and whether they have alleged a personal 
injury seems to me to go to their fitness to raise the issue 
not to the appropriateness of the issue ~f for judicial resolution.' 
In Data Processin~~he Court said that the two tests for 
standing NN~x wer~ether the plaintiff alleged that the challenged 
action caused him iNNx~ injury in fact an~hether the interest 
sought to be protected by the plaintiff were arguably within the 
zone ot interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or 
constitutional guranty in question. The answer to the second test 
arguably 
is easy for surely the interest of speech and privacy are/within 
the zone of interests protected by the 1st and 4th amendments. 
The answere to the first test is all, I submit, that the govt 
is really arguing about. 
For the govt cannot seriously maintain that the underlyin~ 
issues in this case--free speech and privacy--are not within 
the domain of the judiciary. These are values committed by 
the Constitution for judicial protection because they are 
\
anti-majpritarian values. A person's right to S:l!ll!l speech and 
privacy is to be protected from the majoritarian instincts of 
Congres and the President, not protected by themo Thus, if 
the allegations of the complaint xais:~ show that resps' right 
to speech and privay are being invaded, :KN~axxxR~a then they 
may seek judicial redress. 
" 
-ll:- ~1~~ 
It is clear to :ma: me that the allegations are~iq~act to 
g ive resps standing to raise these justiciable issues. The 
~~ 
complaint alleges that thjh:' 1st amendment rights and rights 
to privacy have been abridged. Throug~ut its brief, the govt 
ignores entirely the allegations about privacy, and yet if 
the Army is acting beyond iss authority in a way that invades 
the Constitutionally protected privacy of resps, there is no 
question that they are entitled to redress. Nor can the govt 
argue with respect to privacy, that the complaint is not XNXXi£ieNx 
e specific enough; the ExieXxNa:xxa: complaint has attached to 
it an example of Army surveilance which indicates that some 
of resps have been spied on and have ERRNXXNXEX had records 
made. Unless the Court is willing to say that under no circumstances 
and keeping dossiers invade the privacy of civilians, there 
is a genuine issue here of whether this invasion was reasonable. 
Thus, on the privacy issue alone, largely i gnored in the govt's 
brief, there is standing for resps to sue. 
There is also, it seems to me, standing to raise the 
chilling effect claim. That is of course a peculiar claim in 
that it alleges a negative harm; the resps allege that they 
have been unable or afraid to do somethingx they are Constitutionally 
entitled to do because of the actions of the government. 
But the mere fact that it is a negative harm that is alleged 
does not mean that it is none the less genuine. This Court 
has recognized the harm before, most notably in Do~browski kx 




allowed to bring a §1983 action against La officials f~x to 
prevent them from ~~XXR« prosecuting or threatening prosecution 
under a state law alleged to be overbraod and an inhibition on 
political activities. Dombrowski was not concerned with 
justiciability or standing, which were assumed, but with 
the abstention doctrine, as was Younger v. Harris, 401 u·zs. 
37 (197l),which limited Dombrowski somewhat. The point is 
that no one denies that in a c~se where comity does not dictate 
to the contrary--amd there is of course no comity issue here--
~ allegations of a chilling effect xxRx of illegal actions 
are justiciable. 
The govt argues that the allegations of resps are not 
specific enough. To a certain extent that is the nature of 
the chilling effect doctrine; how can one be specific about 
the road not x taken. If the resps could cite actual prosecutions 
ar firings or other abuses, they could serve as the basis of 
a suit, but resps allege that there have been kN~WNX~ none 
of these because the threat of them has }llX~N inhibited the 
political activity of persons subject to actual sanctions so 
that no sanctions have had to be imposed. In other words, 
~ 
the respsAsay that the l\lNX~NXRXN alleged purpose and effect 
of harassment and intimidation has worked. Surely, the aleegedly 
illegal acts of the Army are not subject to challenge only if 
they do not work, MNXXRXXM~XR~XRX~XXXXXRRMXXXNXMRXXNXXXXX 
Secondly, the nature of the perceived threat resulting from 
the Army's actions can be proven by testimony by resps who 
have actually felt inhibited. Third, I am not at all convinced 
l 
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that it is necessary for resps to specif ically allege or prove 
actual inhibition in the exercise of their 1st amendment rights. 
If the resps can show that they were threate~ in the exercise 
of those rights by illegal Army acts, N surely in the ~XNE 
protected area of 1st amendment rights they are entitled to 
relief, regardless of whether thee threats actually deterred 
them. But finally, to the extent that the govt is arguing that 
the ENm~XaN complaint below was not specific enough, it xx is 
xeax~ really arguing that the pleadings were insufficient, not 
that ~ resps have no standing. Pleadings are, of course, 
liberally construed in the federal system. I x have no doubt 
that this complaintN is sufficient under a liberal construction, 
but if it x is not, amendment is also liberally permittedJ 
There remains the question whether resps have alleged an 
injury personal to them. Nex!RxcxgxiNxxR:Kx The govt's argument 
seems to be based on a statement made in oral argument in the 
court of appeals and mentioned in the dissenting opinion below. 
The lawyer for resps said that they were not so inhibited that ; ; 
they were prevented from bring ing this lawsuit. Therefore, 
the govt concludes that they suffered no personal injury. 
This is obviously wrong . The fact that they brought the suit, 
banded together with others, is no iN indication that they have 
not be inhibited in other areas of political expression. 
Their 1st amendment rights are further affected if in attempting 
to ex persuade others to their views,the~ /find that others are 
in fact cowed by E fear of Army surveilance. Finally, I am 
not at all sure that the admission, out of context as it was, 
would under any circumstances be CXN rele~ant to the construction 
-14-
of the complaint which says specifically that resps were chilled 
in the exercise of their 1st amendement rights. 
1\:xxax~x 
[ The Court has recently considered standing in a cas) 
argued before you came; / Sierra Club -c. Morton, which has 
not yet come down. In that case, the Court held that the 
/"'. 
Sierra Clu~b had no standing to challenge the govt's leasing 
of Mineral King Valley to Walt Disney Enterprises for the 
development of a ski resort. The Sierra Clua alleged only 
that it had a special interest in enviornmental issues and 
failed to allege any ~x interest that seperated it from the 
general populace. But in rejecting its claim of standing , 
the proposed opinion for the Court, written by Justice Stewart, 
holds that if Sierra Club had only alleged some other iNR 
interest, such as the fact that its members often camped in 
MiRNRXX Mineral King , an allegation which the Club specifiaally 
refused to make, it would have had standing . So far the Chief 
and Marshall x have joined Stewart's opiniono Justi~;:..f Douglas -:,. 
is writing a seperate opinion which I cannot characterize. 
Justice Brenan is planning to dissent and would have found 
standing .] 
I think this case should be affirmed. 
AFFI RM Fox 
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No. 71-288 LAIRD v. TATUM 
Argued 3/27/72 
Tentative Impressions* 
1. Case and controversy (justiciable controversy). On this 
issue, the Circuit Court found the following (in addition to various 
other findings): 
"The Army needs a certain amount of information 
in order to perform (its) constitutional and statutory 
missions. " A . 1 'S; 
2. The Army has been called upon "to preserve domestic 
peace against violent protests leading to civil disorders", a role 
A •I"\ r'" 
contemplated by the Constitution."' "Many violent protests were aimed 
directly at military functions . . . ransacking Selective Service offices, 
barring troup and supply trains . . . , unlawful attempts to enter military 
A .. , , C",. I ' c. 
basis. ""In addition there were the Detroit and Newark riots: the 
national guard was called out 83 times during 1967-68, and the Army 
four times "to quell cases of civil disorder". A I 1 l, 
3. "The information gathered is nothing more than a good I 
newspaper reporter would be able to gather by attendance at public 
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument 
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read, 
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the 
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the 
Conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion 
at the Conference. 
•' 
2. 
meetings and the clipping of articles from publications available on 
any news stand." A I' 1-1 J r 
Despite these findings, the majority judges concluded that a 
justiciable controversy was alleged. They reached this c cnclusion 
by the following reasoning: 
"Appellants contend that the present existence of this 
system of gathering and distributing information, 
allegedly far beyond the mission requirements of the 
Army, constitutes an impermissible burden on 
appellants and other persons similarly situated 
which exercise a present inhibiting effect!' on 
First Amendment rights. A . ll' 
Judge MacKinnon, dissenting found there was no justiciable 
controversy. He pointed to plaintiff's brief in which they state that: 
"There is a threat of unknown surveillance, unknown 
purpose and unknown future use of the information 
gathered . . . " A 1 ~ 1 
Judge MacKinnon, referring to this apprehension of the 
"unknown", said: 
"Such indefinite and abstract assertions of amorphous 
fears do not present a case involving facts of a concrete 
nature. " It 1 ~' 
The dissenting opinion also pointed out: 
"There are no allegations or claims that any of the 
information gathered by the Army has been used in 
a manner that has injured plaintiffs or imposed on 
them any penalty attributable to their exercise of 
First Amendment rights. " (Appendix 151) 
' Apparent Mootness: ,.. 
3. 
If a proper case and controversy be assumed, there is a question 
whether there is any need for judicial action. 
The plaintiffs seek ( i) a declaratory judgment that Army 
surveillance of lawful political activity is unconstitutional; (ii) a 
permanent injunction against the spying and the maintaining of records; 
and (iii) a mandatory injunction ordering the Army to produce and 
destroy its records. 
The remand ordered by the Circuit Court (from which this 
appeal is taken) directs the district court to hear the case and determine: 
1. The nature of the Army's intelligence system; 
system 
2. What part of this~ is necessary to discharge the 
" Army's need for domestic intelligence; and 
3. Whether the Army's intelligence gathering system ''has or 
might have an inhibiting effect on plaintiffs or others similarly 
situated. " 
In view, however, of the fact that the Army has discontinued 
its system and voluntarily destroyed its data bank, these inquiries 
would seem to serve no useful purpose. 
4. 
4. Class action. Judge MacKinnon thinks that this is not an 
$ -< 
appropriate class action suit under rule 23(a). (Appendix 153) The 
class described is incapable of definition; it could include millions 
of citizens and hundreds of organizations; it would be impossible to 
determine what rights have been or would be infringed that are common 
to all of these people. This is especially true since nothing has been 
shown to indicate that the data gathered by the Army is not available 
to the news media, all being derived from public gathering. 
I doubt that the case could possibly managed as a class action 
suit without an intolerable burden on the Court, and any decree entered 
would not necessarily be binding on anyone except the Army. 
5. A problem for legislation. It is doubtful whether a court 
could fashion a decree that would accommodate the admitted need of 
the military to collect intelligence data, and at the same time protect -
in a class action suit rather than a case involving specific injury to 
-~ 
a particular individual First Amendment Rights of millions of people. 
" This can best be handled by legislation. The Congress is in 
a position to control the situation completely; to prescribe appropriate 
limits on military intelligence activities; and to police such activities 
in the future. 
•· 
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MEMO TO JUSTICE POWELL 
Re: No. 71-288, Laird v. Tatum 
You asked me to give you the leading case on each side 
of this issue so that you could prepare for Conference. 
Clearly the leading case is Flast v. Cohen, 392 u.s. 83 (1968). 
_Elast held that a taxpayer had standing to sue on a claim that 
a federal aid to education program violated the Establishment 
Clause. It is difficult for me to see how the harm alleged in 
this case is any less specific than the harm alleged by a 
plaintiff whose sole harm is that the miniscule part of his 
taxes that is spent for this program is spent unconstitutionally" 
On the other side, there is no leading case really. Flast 
is cited by the govt as much as any other case. Perhaps one 
case in the govt's favor is United Public Workers_y. Mitchell, 
330 u.s. 75 (1947), but it is rather old and the concept of 
justiciability has evolved to a considerable degree since 1947. 
You might also want to take a look at Justice Stewart's 
circulation in Sierra Club v. Morton, No. 70-34. That case 
was argued last fall. The Court has voted that Sierra Club 
did not have standing to sue, and Justice Stewart was assigned 
the opinion. So far only the Chief and Marshall have joined 
him. Douglas has circulated a seperate opinion, and Brennan 
is dissenting but has not yet circulated anything. However, 
I think it is safe to say that at least 5 members of the Court 
--Stewart, Chief, Marshall, Douglas, Brennan--go asxxxxx at 
~east as far as Stewart's opinion on the question of standing, 
which is pretty far. 
Fox 
DouGLAS, J. ~f~f-.-:,<A.J 
t.. I h.-~ t · 
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MEMO TO JUSTICE POWELL 
Re: No. 71-288, Laird v. Tatum 
The Chief Justice has circulated an opinion, actually a 
memorandum) in this case, and Justice Douglas has circulated 
a dissent. I am a bit at a loss to explain what the Chief's 
opinion says. I had thought this case was concerned with 
the issues of standing and justiciability as they arise on 
a motion to dismiss, that is without any facts being in the 
record. The Chief, however, goes outside the pleadings and 
considers as facts affidavits intrcfiYced in the hearing on 
the preliminary injurlction in this case. These affidavits 
cannot be accepted as true; indeed they are altogehter 
irrelevant because on a motion to dismiss all that may be 
considered are the pleadings which must be construed most 
favorably._for the plaintiff. Moreover, the Chief considers 
other material concerning the Army's dismantling the surveilance 
system which was not even in those affidavits. None of these 
things have been controverted by resps because they have never 
been given an opportunity to do so. They sought and were 
denied a hearing below to controvert the govt's affidavits. ~ 
It is therefor hig}y improper to not only consider these V,' ~ 
affidavits, but to assume their truth, ',/~  
Taking the allegations of resps as this ~ ~ . 
Court must do on a motion to dismiss, the questio before ~~ 
the Court is whetherftnauthorized and spyin ~y the 
Army violates the Constitution in that it exercise, 
by its very existence, of free speech and in that it invades 
privacy. In rejecting this claim, the Chief notes, ."We do not 
. .... ··- '• 
-2-
believe that the determination of whether this complaint-
states a claim upon which relief can be granted is to be made 
on the basis of the identity of the parties named as defendants 
in the complaint." That, I submit, is a ludicrous proposition. 
It says that a claim that surveilance by the Army, an institutionxxx~ 
xxltx:ki!IXKNM!R'XIIOCXRR historically and to some extent, as Justice 
Douglas points out in part I of his dissent, Constitutionally 
distrusted in this country, is no more ominous than surveilance 
by the Board of Tea Tasters, another instrumentality of the 
federal government. Of course the identify of a defendant 
affects whether a complaintstates a cause of action; under a 
§1983 complaint one of the crucia*-ssties in determining whether 
a cause of action is stated is-to decide whether the defendant 
is an instrumentality of the state and thereby acting under 
state law. 
Perhaps more important,the Chief says there is no 
legally cognizable claim because there is no allegation that 
an one has been fired from a job or thrown in jail bee 
of misuse of the information the Army has gathered. But 
there is a claim that the very system 
to chill the exercise of resps' first 
claim that has been treated seriously in the pas • In fact 
resps include in their brief an essay on the sociological 
realities of such a chilling effect for those who think 
such a thing is not possible. It may well be that there was 
no chilling effect here, but that is a question of fact and 
there are no facts in the record of this case. 





the information was gathered y ilQegal means. That is not 
true. Resps alleged that s ch unauthorized surveilance by 
the Army was itself illegal, and Senator E~in's oral argument 
specifically addressed this point. Moreover, the complaint 
did not allege, as the Chief implies that only legal means 
"available to a newspaper reporter" were used; it alleged 
nothing at all about means. It said that the very existence 
of the system, not the way it operated, was impermissible. -Finally, attached to the complaint as an exhibit was an 
~written by an ex-Army intelligence agent, and it 
contains means of surveilance alleged to have been used 
which if not illegal are certainly of questionable legality. 
Third, it is incorrect to describe the complaint as 
alleging only that the Army has collected information which 
it does not need and which it might possibli misuse in the 
future. The complaint is that the existence of such a system 
whether the information is misued or not, chills free speech 
and invades privacy in violation of the Constitution. The 
Chief's statement is a distortion of the complaint. This ~ 
7 
complaint is not concerned with speculative wrong-doings. ~ ~ ~ 
If this complaint does not present a case that a court 
may decide, then I am unable to see how a court can ever 
consider a case based on an establishment of religion claim. 
Certainly when the state impermissibly spends money to benefit 
a particular religion, there is no direct injury to taxpayers 
other than what propably amounts to a few cents worth. The 
only injury is to the Constitutional values. How much less 
-4-
precise and more speculative is such a complaint than this 
in which it is alleged that the government is deliberately 
chilling the exercise of free speech and invading the privacy 
of citizens. Yet we know that such establishment of religion 
cases can be brought. 
The Chief's fall-back line of argument is what I call 
neo-mootness. He cannot say that the case is moot because 
that is a factual issue and because even the governement does 
not allege that it has stopped these activities complete]y. 
Instead, he says that "equity should stay its hand". Where 
does this equitable doctrine come from? There is a doctrine 
of abstention, but that is a branch of comity that arises in 
federal-state cases. There simply is no such doctrine. 
Moreover, his attempt to distinguish the Wadmond case is 
unsuccessful. He says that that case involved a regulatory 
system whereas presumably this case concerns an investagatory 
system. But why does that matter? He does not say. He 
finally comes back to his same point--that this case is 
based on hypothetical future conduct. But that is simply 
not true; the case is based on the chilling effect of the 
existence of such a .e'Eatttte-• .s-irt-<'- fc.-cr-e. 
-lh.e Y'o-li"" 
At one point you expressed to meA that perh.a·ps this case 
was like the welfare case the Court heard earlier in the year 
in which the government enacted eleventh hour regulations. 
I have always maintained that what the Court did in that 
case was a disgraceful ducking of its judicial responsibility, 
but I do not think the case is relevant here anyhow. In 
•· 
-5-
that case, the issue was the legality of the regulations. 
When those regulations were changed, the issue may have 
been mooted. But more importantly, aletering the regulations 
may have offered the APTD recipients the relief they sought. 
That certainly is not the case here. Resps are not seeki~g 
to change the method in which the Army carries out its s~rveilance 
activities over civilians; they are claiming that the entire 
system is illegal. Only striking down the system would give 
~~~ 
~ 
them the relief they claim for the invasion of their priv.acy ~ 
In addition, the welfare ~ and chilling of their free speech. 
case did not come up on a motion to dismiss and the case w! 
was not dismissed but remanded. Even if the cases were 
parellel, the result should be to remand to the district · 
court to see if the case was in fact moot. But that is not 
t he result the Court proposes to reach. 
The final irony about this case is that the Court 
~ proposes to dismiss a complaint as being too hypothetical 
1' ~ t when we know from Sen Erwin' s hearings that there was in fact , , 
~ an abuse of authority, a mis-[sVe of information, and probably 
a chilling effect that resulted from these activities. 
Although Justice Douglas refers to the Hearings in his dissent 
they, like all the factual material the Chief refers to, are 
not legally congnizable in the posture this case takes. 
But it seems to me strange at best to wrench around standing 
and justiciability in a way that is supported by no case law 
in order to say that a case is too hypothetical when we know 
in fact that it is not hypothetical at all. 
Fox 
I , --
,. I 0 
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I 
If Congress had passed a law authorizing the armed 
services to establish surveillance over the civilian popu-
lation, a most ~erious constitutional problem would be 
presented. There is, however, no such law under which 
in this case the-15'entagon undertook surveillance over 
civilians. The question is whether such authority may 
be implied. One can search the Constitution in vain for 
"L 1f· 
, 11 any such authority. 
, (l _-f.u ~ 0 ~...t... The start of the problem is the constitutional distinc-
1 ~· -1 ~ ~ ~ tion between the "militia" and the Armed Forces. By 
( C:....L l ) Art. I, § 7, of the Constitution the militia is specifically 
I" confined to precise duties: "to execute the laws of the 
union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions." 
This obviously means that the "militia" cannot be 
sent overseas to fight wars. They are purely a domestic 
arm of the governors of the ~everal States/ save as they 
may be called under Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution into 
the federal service. Whether the "militia" could be 
given powers comparable to those granted the FBI is a 
question not now raised. For we deal here not with the 
1 I have expressed my doubts whether the "militia" Jo~rs it s 
constitutional role by an Act of Congress which incorporate~ it 
in the armed sen-ices. Drifka v. B mina.rd, 89 Sup. Ct. Rrp. 434_ 
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"militia" but " ·ith "armies." The Army, Navy, and Air 
Force are comprehended in the constitutional term 
"armies." Art. I, § F, provides that Congress may "raise 
and support armies," and "provide and maintain a navy," 
and make "rules for the government and regulation of 
the land and naval forces." And the Fifth Amendment 
excepts from the requirement of a presentment or indict-
ment of a grand jury "cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the militia. when in actual service in time 
of war or public danger." 
Acting under that authority, Congress has provided a 
code governing the Armed Services. That code sets the 
procedural standards for the Government and regulation 
of the land and naval forces. It is difficult to imagine ( 
how those powers can be extended to military surveillance 
over civilian affairs. 
The most pointed and relevant decisions of the Court 
ou the limitation of military authority concern the at-
tempt of the military to try civilians. The first leading 
case was Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 124, where the 
Court noted that the conflict between "civil liberty" and 
"martialla\\'" is "irreconcilable." The Court which made 
that am1ouncf'mcnt would have been horrified at the 
prospect of the military- absent a regime of martial 
la\\'-establishing a regime of survcil1ance over civilians. 
The power of the military to establish such a system is 
obviously less than the power of Congress to authorize 
such surveillauce. For the authority of Congress is re-
stricted by its po"·er to "raise" armies, Art. I , ~ 7; and, 
to repeat. its authority over the Armed Forces is stated 
in these terms, "To make rules for the government and 
regulations of the land and naval forces. " 
The Constitution contains many provisions guarantee-
ing rights to persons. Those include the right to indict-
ment by a grand jury and the right to trial by a jury of 
one's peers. It includes the procedural safeguards of the 
Sixth Amendment in criminal prosecutions; the protec-
71-288-DISSENT 
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tiou against double jeopardy, cruel and unusual punish-
ments-and of course the First Amendment. The alarm 
was sounded in the Constitutional Convention about the 
dangers of the armed services. Luther Martin of Mary-
land said, " ... "·hen a government wishes to deprive its 
citizcns of freedom and reduce them to slavery, it gen-
erally makes usc of a standing army." ~ That danger, 
we have held, exists not only in bold acts of usurpation 
of pmycr, but in gradual encroachments. We held that 
court-martial jurisdiction cannot be extended to reach 
any pcrson not a member of the Armed Forces at the 
times both of the offense and of the trial, which elimi-
nates discharged soldiers. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11. 
Neither civilian employees of the Armed Forces overseas, 
McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U. S. 281; Grisham v. H a jan, 
361 U. S. 278, nor civilian dependents of military per-
sonnel accompanying them overseas, Kinsella v. Singleton, 
361 U. S. 234; Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, may be tried 
by court martial. And even as respects those in the 
Armed Forces we have held that an offense must be 
"service connected" to be tried by court-martial rather 
than by civilian tribunals. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 
U. S. 2:38, 272. 
The upshot is that the Armed Services-as distin-
guished from the "militia"-are not regulatory agencies 
or bureaus that may be created as Congress desires and 
grantcd such powers that seem necessary and proper. 
The authority to provide rules "governing" the Armed 
Services means the grant of authority to the Armed 
Services to govern themselves, not the authority to gov-
ern civilians. Even when "martial law" is declared, as 
it often has been, its appropriateness is subject to ju-
dicial rcvie\\', Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 401, 
403-404. 
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Our tradition reflects a desire for civilian supremacy 
and subordination of military power. The tradition goes 
back to the Declaration of Independence in which it was 
recited that the King "has affected to render the mili-
tary independent of and superior to the civil power." 
Thus we have the "militia" restricted to domestic use, 
the restriction of appropriations to the "armies" to two 
years, Art. I, § 7, and the grant of command over the 
armies and the 1nilitia when called into actual service 
of the United States to the President, our chief civilian 
officer. The tradition of civilian control over the Armed 
Forces was stated by Chief Justice Warren: 3 
i'The military establishment is, of course, a neces-
sary organ of government; but the reach of its 
power must be carefully limited lest the delicate 
balance between freedom and order be upset. The 
maintenance of the balance is made more difficult by 
the fact that while the military services the vital 
function of presrn-ing the existence of the nation, 
it is, at the same time, the one element of govern-
ment that exercises a type of authority not easily 
assimilated in a free society .... 
"In times of peace, the factors leading to an ex-
traordinary deference to claims of military necessity 
have naturally not been as weighty. This has been 
true even in the all too imperfect peace that has 
been our lot for the past fifteen years-and quite 
rightly so, in my judgment. It is instructive to re-
call that our Nation at the time of the Constitutional 
Convention was also faced with formidable problems. 
The English, the French, the Spanish, and various 
tribes of hostile Indians were all ready and eager to 
subvert or occupy the fledgling Republic. Never-
theless, in that environment, our Founding Fathers 
3 The Bill of Rights and the 11ilitary, 37 N . Y. U. L. llcv . 1Sl , 
182, 193 (1962). 
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conceived a Constitution and Bill of Rights replete 
with provisions indicating that determination to pro-
tect human rights. There was no call for a garrison 
state in those times of precarious peace. We should 
heed no such call now. If we were to fail in these 
days to enforce the freedom that until now has been 
the American citizen's birthright, we would be aban-
doning for the foreseeable future the constitutional 
belance of powers and rights in whose name we arm." 
It was in that tradition that Youngstown Sheet ana 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, was decided in which 
President Truman's seizures of the steel mills in the so-
called Korean War was held unconstitutional. As stated 
by Justice Black: 
"The order cannot properly be sustained as an 
exercise of the President's military power as Com-
mander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The Gov-
ernment attempts to do so by citing a number 
of cases upholding broad powers in military com-
manders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater-
of war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even 
though 'theater of war' be an expanding concept~ 
we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional 
system hold that the Commander in Chief of the· 
Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to-
take possession of private property in order to keep 
labor disputes from stopping production. This is 
a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its 
military authorities." ld., 587. 
Madison expressed the fear of military dominance:' 
"The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch 
for the undisciplined valor of all other nations, and 
rendered her the mistress of the world. 
"Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome 
4 The Federalist No. 41. 
G 
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proved the final victim to her military triumphs; 
and that the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever 
existed, have, with few exceptions, been the price 
of her military establishments. A standing force, 
therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it 
may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest 
scale it has its inconveniences. On an extensive· 
scale its consequences may be fatal. On any scale 
it is an object of laudable circumspection and pre-
caution. A wise nation will combine all these con-
siderations; and whilst it docs not rashly preclude 
itself from any resource \Yhich may become essen-
tial t<> its safety, will exert all its prudence in dimin-
ishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting 
to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties. 
"The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped 
on the proposed Constitution. The Union itself, 
which it cements and secures, destroys every pretext 
for a military establishment which could be danger-
ous. America united, with a handful of troops, or 
without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding 
posture to foreign ambition than America disunited, 
with a hundred thousand veterans ready for combat." 
As Chief Justice Warren has observed, the safeguards 
in the main body of the Constitution did not sn,tisfy 
the people on their fear and concern of military 
dominance: r. 
"They were reluctant to ratify the Constitution 
without further assurances, and thus we find in the 
Bill of Rights Amendments 2 and 3, specifically 
authorizing a decentralized militia, guaranteeing the 
right of the people to keep and bear arms, and pro-
hibiting the quartering of troops in any house in 
r. Op. rit. n. 3, sup1"a, :~t 18!"\. 
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time of peace without the consent of the owner. 
Other Amendments guarantee the right of the peo-
ple to assemble, to be secure in their homes against 
umeasonable searches and seizures, and in criminal 
cases to be accorded a speedy and public trial by 
an impartial jury after indictment in the district 
and state "·herein the crime was committed. The 
only exceptions made to these civilian trial proce-
dures are for cases arising in the land and naval 
forces. Although there is undoubtedly room for 
argument based on the frequently conflicting sources 
of history, it is not unreasonable to believe that 
our Founders' determination to guarantee the pre-
eminence of civil over military power was an im-
portant element that prompted adoption of the Con-
stitutional Amendments we call the Bill of Rights." 
The action in turning the "armies" loose on surveil-
lance of civilians \Yas a gross rcpudia tion of our 
traditions. The military, though important to us, is 
subservient and restricted purely to military missions. 
It even took an Act of Congress to allow a member of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to address the Congress; 6 and 
that small step did not go unnoticed but was in faet 
viewed with alarm by those respectful of the civilian 
tradition. The act of turning the military loose on 
civilians even if sanctioned by an Act of Congress. which 
it has not been, would raise serious and profound con-
stitutional questions. Standing as it docs only on brute 
~
G The Act of Angnst 10, 19·!9, proYidr~ in § 202 (c) (6): 
"K o prori:;ion of this Aet ~hall be ~o ronstrucd as to prc1·rnt 
:1 Serr0tnry- of a military dcpnrtmcnt or a m0mbcr of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff from prc1'10nting to the Congre~~. on hi:,; own initin-
tiYe, :tftcr first so informing the Secr0tnry of Defense, ::my re('Om-
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power and Pentagon policy, it must be re1mdiated as a 
USUii)ation dangerous to the civil liberties on 1vhich free 
men are dependent. 
II 
The claim that respondents have no standing to chal-
lenge the Army's surveillance of them and the other 
members of the class they seek to represent is too trans-
parent for serious argument. The surveillance of the 
Army over the civilian sector-a part of society hitherto 
immune from their control-is a serious charge. It is 
alleged that the Army maintains files on the membership, 
ideology, programs, and practices of virtually every acti-
vist political group in the country, including groups like 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Clergy 
and Laymen United Against the War in Vietnam, The 
American Civil Liberties Union, "ViTomens Strike for Peace, 
and the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People. The Army uses undercover agents to 
infiltrate these civilan groups and to reach into con-
fidential files of students and other groups. The Army 
moves as a secret group among civilian audiences, using 
cameras and an electronic ear for surveillance. The data 
it collects are distributed to civilian officials in state, fed-
eral, and local governments and to each military intelli-
gence unit and troop command under the Army's juris-
diction (both here and abroad); and these data are 
stored in one or more data banks. Those are the allega-
tions; and the charge is that the purpose and effect of 
the system of surveillance is to harass and intimidate the 
respondents and to deter them from exercising their rights 
of political expression, protest, and dissent "by invading 
their privacy, damaging their reputations, adversely af-
fecting their employment and their opportunities for 
employment and in other ways." Their fear is that 
"permanent reports of their activities will be maintained 
in the Army's data bank, and their 'profiles' will appear 
71-288-DISSEKT 
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in the so-called 'Blacklist' and that all of this information 
will be released to numerous federal and state agencies· 
upon request." 
Judge Wilkey, speaking for the Court of Appeals, 
properly held that this Army surveillance "exercises a ~ 
present inhibiting effect on their full expression and utili-
zation of their First Amendment rights." 444 F. 2d, at 
That is the test. The "deterrent effect" on First 
Amendment rights by government oversight marks an 
unconstitutional intrusion, Lamont v. Postmaster Gen-
eral, 381 U. S. 301, 307. Or as stated by MR. JusTICE 
BRENNAN, "inhibition as well as prohibition against the 
exercise of precious First Amendment rights is a power 
denied to government." /d., at 309. When refusal of 
the Court to pass on the constitutionality of an Act under 
the normal consideration of forbearance "would itself 
have an inhibitory effect on freedom of speech" then the 
Court will act. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 32. 
As stated by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, "there 
is good reason to permit the strong to speak for the weak 
or the timid in First Amendment matters." Anderson 
v. Sills, 56 N. J. 210, 220 (1970). 
One need not wait to sue until he loses his job or until 
his reputation is defamed. To withhold standing to sue 
until that time arrives would in practical effect immunize 
from judicial scrutiny all surveillance activities regard-
less of their misuse and their deterrent effect. As stated 
in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 101, " ... in terms of 
Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the 
question of standing is related only to whether the dis-
pute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an 
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as 
capable of judicial resolution." Or as we put it in Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204, the gist of the standing issue 
is whether the party seeking relief has "alleged such a 
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to. 
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assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the pres-
entation of issues upon which the court so largely 
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional 
questions." 
The present controversy is not a remote, imaginary 
conflict. Respondents were targets of the Army's sur-
veillance. First, th_e surveillance \vas not casual but 
massive and comprehensive. Second, the intelligence --reports were regularly and widely circulated and were 
exchanged '"ith reports of the FBI, state and n1unicipal 
police departments, and the CIA. Third, the Army's 
surveillance was not collecting material in public records 
but staking-out teams of agents, infiltrating undercover 
agents, creating command posts inside meetings, posing 
as press photographers and newsmen, posing as TV news-
men, posing as students, shadowing public figures. 
Finally, we know from the hearings conducted by 
Senator Erwin that the Army has misused or abused its 
reporting functions. Thus Senator Erwin concludes that 
reports of the Army ha.-e been "taken from the Intelli-
gence Command's highly inaccurate civil disturbance 
teletype and filed in Army dossiers on persons who have 
held, or were being considered for, security clearances, 
thus contaminating "·hat are supposed to be investigative 
reports 'vith unverified gossip and rumor. This practice 
directly jeopardized the employment and employment 
opportunities of persons seeking sensitive positions with 
the federal government or defense industry." 7 
Surveillance of civilians is none of the Army's consti-
tutional business and Congress has Hot undertaken to 
entrust it with any such function. The fact that since 
this litigation started the Army's surveillance has been 
1 Hearings, Subcommittee on Con~titutional Hi~h1s, Sen. Jnd. Com-
mittee, 92d Cong., bt Sess., Feb. 23-25, Mnrch 2-4, 9-11, 15, 17 
(1971). 
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cut back is not an end of the matter. Whether there 
has been an actual cutback or whether the announce-
ments are merely a ruse can be determined only after a 
hearing in the District Court. W c arc advised by an 
arnicus brief filed by a group of former Army Intelligence 
Agents that Army surveillance of civilians is rooted in 
s~ programs of long standing. "Army_ intelligence 
has been maintaining an unauthorized watch over civilian 
political activity for nearly 30 years. Nor is this the 
first time that Arrny intelligence has, without notice to 
its civilian superiors, overstepped its mission. From 1917 
to 1924, the Corps of Intelligence Police maintained a 
massive surveillance of civilian political activity which 
involved the use of hundreds of civilian informants, the 
infiltration of civilian organizations and the seizure of 
dissenters and unionists, sometimes " ·ithout charges. 
That activity was opposed-then as now-by civilian of-
ficials on those occasions when they found out about it, 
but it continued unabated until post-war disarmament 
and economies finally eliminated the bureaucracy that 
conducted it." 
This case is a cancer in our body politic. It is a meas-
ure of the disease which afflicts us. ~rmy_ surveillance, 
1~ rmy J.'egimentation, is at war wit the principles of 
the Fir m ndment. 'I11o'Se "·ho already walk sub-,._.--
missively will say there is no cause for alarm. But sub-
missiveness is not our heritage. The First Amendment 
was designed to allow rebellion to remain as our heritage. 
The Constitution was designed to keep government off 
the backs of the people. The Bill of Rights was added 
to keep the precincts of belief and expression, of the 
press, of political and social activities free from surveil-
lance. The Bill of Rights was designed to keep agents 
of government and official eavesdroppers away from as-
semblies of people. The aim was to allow men to be 
free and independent and to assert their rights against 
71-288-DISSENT 
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government. There can be no influence more paralyzing 
of that objective than Army surveillance. When an In-
telligence Officer looks over every nonconformist's shoul-
der in the library or walks invisibly by his side in a picket 
line or infiltrates his club, the America once extolled as 
the voice of liberty around the world no longer is cast 
in the image which Jefferson and Madison designed. 
To: The Chie~ Justice 
Mr . Justice Douglas 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
ur . Justice WhitA 
Kr. Justice Karshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
~ Mr . Justice Powell 
Mr . Justice Rehnquist 
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MR. JUSTICE BHENN AN, dissenting. 
The Court of Appeals held that a justiciable con-
troversy exists and that petitioners state a claim upon . 
which relief could be granted. 444 F. 2d 947, 958. Cf'" 
I agree with Judge Wilkey, writing for the Court of ~ ~ I D~J 
Appeals, that this conclusion is compelled for the fol- ~ ~~ 
lowing reasons stated by him: / r ~ 7 
" ... [A]ppellants conten~ that the present exis- ~ ' 
tence !2l this syst em of gathering and distributing .P+ 
information, allegedly far beyond the mission re-
quirements of thr Army, constitutes an impermis-
sible burden on [petitioners] and other persons 
similarly situated >vhich exercises a presen t inhibit-
ing effect on their full expression and utilization 
of their First Amendment rights of free speech, etc. 
The baleful effect, if there is one, is thus a present 
inhibition of lawful behavior and of First Amend-
ment rights. 
"Under this view of fpetitioner's] allegations, 
under justiciability standards it is the operation 
of the system itself which is the breach of the 
Army's duty toward Jf;etitioners] and other civil-
ians. The case is t erefore ripe for adjudication. 
Because the evil alleged in the Army intelligence 
system is that of overbreadth, i. e., the collection 
.. 
2 
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of information not reasonably relevant to the Army's 
mission to suppress civil disorder, and because there 
is no indication that a better opportunity "·ill arise 
to test the constitutionality of the Army's action , 
the issue can be considered justiciable at this time." 
Id., 954- 956 (emphasis in original). 
Further, and, in my view, the complete answer to the 
basis of the Court's disposition today: 
"To the extent that the Army's a.rgument against 
justiciability here includes the claim that [peti-
tioners] lack standing to bring this action, we can-
not agree. If the Army's system does indeed dero-
gate First Amendment values, the [petitioners] are 
persons who are sufficiently affected to permit 
their complaint to be heard. The record shows 
that most if not all of the [petitioners] and/ or 
the organizations of which they are members have 
been the subject of Army surveillance and the· 
names have appeared m the Army's records. Since 
this is precisely the injury of which [petitioners] 
complain, they have standing to seek redress for 
that alleged injury in court and will provide the· 
necessary adversary interest that is required by the 
standing doctrine, on the issue of whether the actions 
complained of do in fact inhibit the exercise of 
First Amendment rights. Nor should the fact that 
these particular persons are sufficiently uninhibited 
to bring this suit be any ground for objecting to· 
their standing." I d., at 954, n. 17. 
Petitioners may or may not be able to prove the· 
case they allege. But I agree with the Court of Ap-
peals that they are entitled to try. I would therefore 
affirm the remand to the District Court for a trial and 
determination of the issues specified by the Court of 
Appeals. 
CHAMBER S Of 
THE CHIEF JU STICE 
end 
No. 71-288 -- Laird v. Tatum 
To: Vr. Justioe Douglas 
Xr. Just t ee Brennan 
llr. .Just; ce Stewart 
llr · J uct ce Wh:tt~ 
Mr . Ju~t :t oe lC1r shall 
llr . Ju tioe Blaokmun 
llr · Ju tice Powell / 
Kr. Justice Rehnquiat 
From : The \., ..... _ ...... __ 
<.4 ..;; C.J.Oe 
Circulated: 
--:-:--:-:-----
Recirculated; JUN 1 1972 
My records show a conference vote of 4 - 4 with one vote tentative in 
each 4. I reserved at the time and further study of the case led to a deci s ion 
to reverse, with possible consideration of a remand if needed. It now seems 
to me that a remand is unnecessary. 
The petitioners here are the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 
the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Commanding General of 
the Army Intelligence Command. They were named as defendants in a com.- ; ,. 
plaint filed in the District Court by respondents, who are four individuals 
and nine unincorporated membership associations. The respondents brought 
the action in behalf of themselves and ''all other individuals and organizations 
who wish to exercise their right under the First Am.endment ••. to engage in 
peaceful political prate st •.• and other forms of constitutionally protected 
expression and a ssemblies without surveillance by [petitioners'] agents and 












Petitioners, without filing an answer to the con>plaint, moved to dismiss, and 
the District Court granted the motion. On respondents' appeal from the order 
of dismissal, a divided Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the case re-
manded for further proceedings. We have concluded that the Jomplaint was 
properly dismissed by the Distrist Court, and we accordingly lever se the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
The complaint alleged that petitioners, acting through the Army Intelli-
---------------'-
gence Command, were engaged in the surveillance of lawful civilian political 
activity; that information about such activity was collected from a variety of 
reporting sources, including the Army's agents, the Federal Du~eau of In-
vestigation, and state and local police departments; that the information so 
collected was compiled and stored in a computerized data bank located at the 
Army Intelligence Command Headquarters at Fort Holabird, Maryland; 
that the reports submitted by the Army's agents were also widely disseminated 
to Army outposts; that a so-called "blacklist'' containing verbal "profiles" of 
various individuals and organizations was published by the Army and distributep " 
within Army Intelligence circles; and that the Army contemplated making 
information contained in the computerized data bank available to "numerous 
federal and state agencies upon request. 11 The complaint further alleged 
that the "purpose and effect" of the Army 1 s surveillance program was to "harass 
and intimidate" respondents and others similarly situated and "to deter them 
from exercising their rights of political expression .•. protected by the 
II 
/ 







·' . ..... \ 
-3-
being irreparably injured. Respondents sought as relief a declaratory 
judgement that the Army was exceeding its statutory and constitutional 
authority in engaging in these activities, an injunction against the continuation 
of the activities, and a judgment mandating the destruction of tl records 
heretofore compiled in the course of those activities. \ 
(1) 
Although the District Court dismissed the complaint without an answer 
having been filed by petitioners, there is in the record a considerable amount 
------------------- -
of background information regarding the activities of which respondents 
-----------------~--~~----------------------·----
complained. Both parties filed a number of affidavits and other material in --connection with respondents 1 motion for a preliminary injunction and with 
petitioners 1 motion to dismiss. See Rule 12 (b), Fed. R. Civ. P. A brief 
review of that information is helpful to an understanding of the issues. 
The President is authorized by 10 U.S. C. § § 331-332 to make use I V 
of the armed forces to quell insurrection and other domestic violence if and 
when the conditions describe d in those sections obtain within one or more 
]j 
of the states. Pursuant to these provisions, President Johnson ordered 
!/ 
The constitutionality of these statutory provisions is not at issue 
here, but their specific authorization of such use of federal armed forces, in 
addition to state militia, appears to be fully compatible with the requirement 
of Article IV. § 4, that the 11United States ••• shall protect each of [the 
individual States] .•• on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive 
















federal troops to assist local authorities at the time of the civil disorders w 
Detroit, Michigan in the summer of 1967 and during the disturbances that 
followed the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. Prior to the Detroit 
disorders, the Army had a general contingency plan for provi\ding such 
\ 
as sistanc c to local authorities, but the 196 7 experience led Ar
1
my authorities 
to believe that more attention should be given to such preparatory planning. 
The surveillance system here involved is said to have been established in 




The system consisted essentially of the collection of information 
about public activities that were thought to have at least some potential for 
civil disorder, the reporting of that information to Army Intelligence h ead-
\ 
quarters at Fort Holabird, the headquarters' dissemination of these reports 
to major Army posts around the country, and the storage of the\ reported in-
formation in a domestic surveillance computer data bank located at Fort 
Holabird. The information itself was collected by a variety of means; the 
-----------------------------~------~------ --consisted of principal source of information ->. items clipped from newspapers and other 
--------~~ . 
publications in general circulation. Some of the information came from Army 
------.. ···----· 
Intelligence agents who attended public meetings and wrote field reports 
describing the meetings, giving such data as the name of the sponsoring or-
ganization, the identity of speakers, the approxilnate number of persons in 
attendance, and an indication of whether any disorder occurred. 
The material filed by the government in the District Court reveals 
that Army Intelligence has field offices in various parts of the country; 
these offices are staffed in the aggregate with approximately 1, 000 agents, 
94% of whose time is devoted to the organization's principal mission, which 
---...,. 
is unrelated to the domestic surveillance system here involved. That principal 
mission was described in one of the documents filed with the District Court 
as the conducting of "investigations to determine whether uniformed members 
of the Army, civilian employees [of the Army] and contractors' employees (/ 
should be granted access to classified information." (App. at 76-77.) 
.. 
... 
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In early 1970 Congress became concerned with the scope of the 
Army's domestic surveillance system; hearings on the rr:atter were held 
before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee 
\ 
on the Judiciary. Meanwhile, the Army, in the course of a reiiew of the 
I 
system, ordered a significant reduction in its scope. The info~mation re-
£erred to in the complaint as the "blacklist'' and the records in the computer 
data bank at Fort Holabird were found unnecessary and were destroyed, along 
with other related records. One copy of all the material relevant to the 
instant suit was, however, retained for possible use in this litigation. (App. 
at 72.) The review leading to the destruction of these records was said at 
the time the District Court ruled on petitioners' motion to dismiss to be a 
"continuing" one (App. at 82), and the Army's policies at that time were re-
presented as follows in a letter from the Under Secretary of the Army to 
• 
Senator Sam J. Ervin, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Rights: 
"[RJ eports concerning civil disturbances will be limited to 
} 
matters of immediate concern to the Army --that is, re-
ports concerning outbreaks of violence or incidents with 
a high potential for violence beyond the capability of state 
and local police and the National Guard to control. These 
reports will be collected by liaison with other Government 
agencies and reported by teletype to the Intelligence Com-
mand. They will not be placed in a computer ...• 
I 
These reports are destroyed 66 days after publication or 
60 days after the end of the disturbance. This limited re-
porting system will ensure that the Army is prepared to 
respond to whatever directions the President may issue 1n 
civil disturbance situations and without watching lawful 
activities of civilians." (App. at 80) 
" ·' 
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In briefs for petitioners filed with this Court, the Solicitor General 
has called our attention to certain directives issued by the Army and the 
Department of Defense subsequent to the District Court 1 s dismissal of the com-
I 
plaint; these directives indicate that the Army 1s review of the \ needs of its 
I 
domestic intelligence activities has indeed been a continuing ore and that 
I 
those activities, which now seem to have been out of proportion to the Army 1 s 
actual needs in the past, have since been significiantly reduced. 
(2) 
The District Court held a combined hearing on respondents 1 motion 
-------------·--~--~---·-· 
for a preliminary injunction and petitioners 1 motion for dismissal and 
._..,.,....- ..... .-.- _,................ ~...... .... ~,...,.........-.....,::war-.__ ........ 
thereafter announced its holding that respondents had failed to state a claim 
..... ,..,... ...,._.~.... ,..-.,..._.....,. ~ w::=-- ,.., ,.., ?") 
upon which relief could be granted, It was the view of the District Court 
that the complaint failed to allege any action on the part of the Army that 
was unlawful in itself and further failed to allege any realistic threats to 
2j 
respondents 1 rights growing out of the Army 1 s actions. 
~I 
I 
In the course of the oral argument the district judge sought clarifica-
tion from respondents 1 counsel as to the nature of the threats perceived by 
respondents; he asked what exactly it was in the Army 1 s activities that tended 
to chill respondents and others in the exercise of their constitutional rights. 
Counsel responded that it was 
l
''precisely the threat in this case that in s01ne future civil disorder 
of some kind, the Army is going to come in with its list of trouble-
makers .•. and go rounding up people and putting them in n~ili­
tar ~· prisons somewhere. 11 
To this the court responded that "we still sit here with the writ of habeas corpus. ,. 
At another point, counsel for respondents took a somewhat different approach in 
arguing that 
1 "we're not q_uite sure _!!xactly what they have in mind and that 
\ cisely what causes the chill, the chilling effe c : ." - -
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In reversing the District Court, the Court o£ Appeals noted that the 
Army does indee d need a certain amount o£ information to carry out its 
mission in regard to domestic violence beyond the capability of local authori-
\ ties to control. It noted also that even though respondents had not alleged 
- =-
I any unlawful activity on the part of the Army, they had alleged that 
"the present existenc e of this system of gathering and distribu-
ting information, allegedly far beyond the mission requirements 
of the Army, .•. exercises a present inhibiting effect on their 
full expression and utilization of their First Amendment rights . 
Under this view of [respondents'] allegations, .•• it is the 
operation of the system itself which is the breach of th y's 
duty;. toward [respondents and Other sJ_vilianS o II 
444 F. Zd 94 7, 954: '(Emphasis 1n .o.riginal.) 
The Court of Appeals considered it "significant 11 that the source of the alleged 
chill here was the Army, rather than a civilian agency, and sought to distinguish 
~I 
the instant case from another of its recent decisions primarily on that ground. 
We do not believe that the determination of whether this complaint 
---------------------------------------------------------------
states a claim upon which relief can be granted is to be made on the basis of 
the identity of the parties named as defendants in the complaint. The 
7 controlling question here is whether the respondents have alleged a legally 
cognizable injury. We hold that they 1:a ve not. There is ro claim here that 
3_! 
In Davis v. Ichord, 442 F. Zd 1207 (CA-DC 1970), a different 
panel of the same court upheld the dismissal of a complaint attacking the 
maintenance of "dossiers 11 on political dissenters in the files of the Internal 






a~y of the information gathered by the Army has been used against re-
spondents or anyone else; nor is there any claim that there have been threats 
i 
of such use. There is no claim that any information has been gathered by 
r-
1 
tre Army by unlawful means, nor indeed that the Army has collected any 
information other than that available to a newspaper reporter or to those 
I . 
members of the general public w:Lo choose to attend various open meetings 
and demonstrations. The claim rather is that the Army has collected m-
formation that it does not need; that, should the Army at some future date 
decide to proceed unlawfully to arrest citizens and deprive them of their 
liberty without due process of law, that information could quite possibly 
be used to single out respondents and other political activists for such 
unlawful treatment; and that, short of such an extreme circumstance, the 
Army might possibly make some presently unforeseeable use of that 
information to the detriment of respondents and the class whose interests 
they seek to represent. 
The jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited by Article III of the 
Constitution to "cases" and "controversies'' arising between adverse 
litigants. 11A declaration on rights as they stand must be sought, not on 
rights which may arise in the future .••• 11 In Re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 
567 (1945). In recent years this Court has found in a number of cases that 
constitutional violations m .ay arise from the deterrent, or "chilling,'' 
effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition 
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yishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 
I 
U.S. 11 ( 1966); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 ( 1965 ); Baggett 
I 
I 
v. 1 Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
These cases have not, however, eroded the 
l -
"established principle that to entitle a private individual to 
invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive 
or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is 
immediately in danger of sustaining a direct in'ury as the result 
oft at achon and it is not s 1c1ent that he has merely a 
general interest common to all members of the public.'' Ex Parte 
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937). 
Not only is there no direct prohibition against respondents' exercise 
of their First Amendment rights involved here, but there is in fact no 
alle ation of any governmental regulation or limitation of any of their activiLes. 
There is no claim of the denial of an individual's right to pursue his vocational 
calling for f a ilure to answer questions posed by a governmental agency, as in 
Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, supra; nor any claim that respondents have 
been required to choose between giving up their employment or thei. r political 
associations in orde ·· to avoid liability to criminal prosecution, as in United 
States v. Robel, supra; nor any claim of discharge or threatened discharge 
from employment by a governmental agency for political acts or associations, 
as in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra. Nor is the claim here like that 
in Lamont v. Postmaster General, supra, where a governmental agency had 
required that an individual take son.J.e affirmative action in order to avoid 






through the normal channels of communication; nor is it like that in Baggett 
I 
I 
v. Bullitt, supra, where subscription to an oath of vague and uncertain mean-
ing was prescribed as a condition of employment by a governmental agency. 
I 
Nor is there any claim here, as inN. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, supra, that an 
I 
I 
an organization has been required under pain of officially imposed sanction 
I 
to reveal its membership list to a governmental agency. Rather, the claim ----------,J 
here, simply stated, is that respondents disagree with the judgments made by 
the Executive branch with respect to the Army's need for information and 
I - -·~--------------------------' 
are fearful that at :some future time the Army might make some unlawful or 
4/ 
) 
Stripped to its essentials, what respondents appear to be seeking is 
a broad scale investigation, corrl ucted by themselves as private parties armed 
with the subpoena power of a federal district court and the power of eros s-
examination to robe into the Army's intelli ence -gathering activities, with the 
district court determ1mng a the conclusion of that investigation the extent to 
which those activities may or may not be appropriate to the Army's mission. 
Cf. the following excerpt from the opinion of the court of appeals: 
"Apparently in the judgment of the civilian head of the Army not 
everything being done in the operation of this intelligence system 
was necessary to the performance of the military mission. If the 
Secretary of the Army can formulate and implement such judg-
ment based on facts within his Departmental knowledge, the United 
States District Court can hear evidence, ascertain the facts, and 
decide what, if any further restrictions on the complained-of acti-
vities are called for to confine the military to their legitimate sphere of 
activity and to protect appellants 1 allegedly infringed constitutional 
rights. 11 444 F. Zd 947, 958. 
l Absent a judicially cognizable injury or threatened injury, such an enterprise, while quite appropriate for a Committee of the Congress, is not one for the 't federal courts. 












otherw1se harrniul use 
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of the allegedly excessive information it has been 
I -
gathering. Speculative apprehensions arising out of the mere possibility 
of future wrongdoing are not sufficient to make out a claim for judicial relief. 
~ ------------------------------------------------~ 
Respondents point to Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, 
401 U.S. 154 (1971), aff'g 299 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N. Y. 1969}, as a case 
I 
where we implicitly found federal court jurisdiction over a challenge to a 
\ 
11 system [that] by its very existence [allegedly] works a 'chilling effect' upon 
the free exercise" of First Amendment rights. 401 U.S. at 159. Wadmond 
is inapposite, however, since the "system" challenged there was a regula tory 
system; specifically, it was a system of statutory provisions governing the 
admission of applicants to the Bar of New York; no other route for admission 
to law practice was available. No issue respecting subject matter jurisdiction 
was presented by the parties when the Wadmond case was here, although the 
three-judge District Court explicitly held that the three complainants who were 
duly enrolled law students had standing to challenge the regul :ttory scheme 
because, as the District Court viewed the matter, those students had "set 
th emselves apart from the public at large'' by undertaking a course of study 
E_l 
Even assuming arguendo that respondents presented an Article 
III "case" at the time they filed their complaint, the representations of 
the Government indicate that equity should stay its hand in this instance. 
A federal court "does not sit to decide arguments after events have put them 
to rest." Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 433 (1952). 
Even though in some circumstances a "court's power to grant injunctive 
relief survives discontinuance of the illegal conduct," it is only by showing 
that future harm is realistically threatened that "tl·,e moving party [can] 
satisfy the court that relief is needed." United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 







specifically directed to prepare them for the practice of law. 299 F. Supp., at 
122. Of more relevance to the issue in the instant case, it was not necessary 
in Wadmond, as it is here, to hypothesize lawless or otherwise improper 
future conduct on the part of the defendants in order to foresee possible future 
!2_1 
harm to the plaintiffs that might give rise to a present "chilling effect." 
I 
Although we hold that respondents 1 complaint was properly dismissed 
by the District Court, no view is intimated as to the propriety or desirability, 
from a policy standpoint, of the challenged activities of the Department of the 
]_/ 
Army. The conclusion that no case or controversy is presented does not 
imply any judicial evaluation of the activities complained of; our conclusion 
is a narrow one, namely, that in the present posture of the case, the parties 1 
fears for the future do not present a case for resolution by the courts; rather 
!:_I 
On the merits , we upheld the constitutionality of the rules and 
other statutory provisions challenged in Wadmond. 
]_/ 
Since we find no case or controversy here, we have no occasion 
to reach the standing issue raised by petitioners. As the Court explained 
in Flast v. Cohe n, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968), questions of standing 
relate to "whether the [plaintiff] is a proper party to request an adjudication 
of a particular is sue and not whether the is sue its elf is justiciable. " 
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the matter may be safely left for continued consideration by the political 
branches to which the cha lleng es are more properly addressed. When and 
if present or inunedia t e ly threatened injury is alleged, there will be time 
enough for courts to pursue the matter. The documentary evidence set 
out in the record in this case and reviewed earlier reveals that the E x ecutive 
i 
and Legislative branches have actively concerned themselves with the 
scope and purpose of the challenged activities, The Executive branch has 
taken steps to cut back significantly on the Army's collection of information 
about civilians, having found, apparently, that much of what was being done 
was inappropriate to the Army's limited role. The Congress can, on the 
basis of its hearings, further restrict that activity by enacting new legislation, 
should it see fit to do so. 
The concern of the Executive and Legislative branches in response 
to disclosure of the Army surveillance activities -- and indeed the claims 
alleged in the complaint -- reflects a traditional and strong resistance of 
Americans to any military intrusion into civilian affairs. That tradition 
has deep roots in our history and found early expression, for example, 
in the Third A1nendment's explicit prohibition against quartering soldiers 
in private homes without consent and in the broad provisions for civilian 
control of the military. Those prohibitions are not directly presented by 
this case, but their philosophical underpinnings explain our traditional in-
Indeed, 
sistence on lin'lita tions on military operations in peacetime. t \ when presented 
with claims of judicially cognizable injury resulting from military intrusion 
,-
-14-
into the civilian sector, federal courts are fully empowered to provide re-
I 
lief t o those suffering such i njury; there is nothing in our Nation's history 
of in this Court's decided cases, including our holding today, that can 
I 
properly be seen as giving any indication that actual or threatened injury 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: ~ ·r c.\110 
Respondents brought this class action in the Distric-A ourt lseeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief on their claim that their rights were being 
invaded by the Army's alleged ''surveillance of lawful civilian political activity." . 
The petitioners in response describe the activity as "gathering by lawful 
means, •.. [and] maintaining and using in their intelligence activities, 
information relating to potential or actual civil disturbances [or] street 
demonstrations. " In connection with respondents 1 motion for a preliminary 
injunction and petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, both parties 
filed a number of affidavits with the District Court and presented their oral 
arguments at a hearing on the two motions. On the basis of the pleadings, 
the affidavits before the court, and the oral arguments advanced at the hearing, 
the District Court granted petitioners' motion to dismiss, holding that there 
was no justiciable claim for relief. 
On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the case 


























as the Court of Appeals held, respondents presented a justiciable controversy 
in complaining of a chilling effect on the exercise of their First Amendment 
rights where such effect is allegedly caused, not by any 11 specific action of 
the Army against them, [but] only [by] the existence and operation of the 
intelligence gathering and distributing system, which is confined to the Army 
and related civilian investigative agencies. 11 444 F. 2d 947, 953. We reverse. 
(1) 
There is in the record a considerable amount of background informa-
tion regarding the activities of which respondents complained; this informa-
tion is set out primarily in the affidavits that were filed by the parties in 
connection with the District Court 1 s consideration of respondents 1 motion for 
a preliminary injunction and petitioners 1 motion to dismiss. See Rule 12 (b), 
Fed. R. Civ. P. A brief review of that information is helpful to an under-
standing of the issues. 
The President is authorized by 10 U.S. C. §§ 331-332 to make use of 
the armed forces to quell insurrection and other domestic violence if and 
when the conditions described in those sections obtain within one or more 
}j 
of the States. Pursuant to these provisions, President Johnson ordered 
]_/ 
The constitutionality of these statutory prov1s1ons is not at issue 
here, but their specific authorization of such use of federal armed forces, in 
addition to state militia, appears to be full y compatible with the requirement of 
Article IV, § 4, that 11[t]he United States .•. shall protect each of [t he indi-
vidual States] .•. on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive 
(when the Legislature cannot be convened} a gains t domestic Violence. 11 
' . 
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federal troopsto assist local authorities at the time of the civil disorders in 
Detroit, Michigan in the summer of 1967 and during the disturbances that 
' 
followed the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. Prior \to the Detroit 
disorders, the Army had a general contingency plan for providing such 
\ 
assistance to loca 1 authorities, but the 1967 experience led Army authorities 
to believe that more attention should be given to such preparatory planning. 
The data-gathering system here involved is said to have been established in 
connection with the development of more detailed and specific contingency 
planning designed to permit the Army, when called upon to assist local 
' 
authorities, to be able to res pond effectively with a minimum of force. As 
the Qour t of Appeals observed, 
"In performing this type function the Army is essentia-lly 
a police force or the back-up of a local police force. To quell 
disturbances or to prevent further disturbances the Army needs 
the same tools and, most importantly, the same information to 
which local police forces have access. Since the Army is sent 
into territory almost invariably unfamiliar to most soldiers and 
their commanders, their need for information is likely to be 
greater than that of the hometown policeman. 
"No logical argument can be made for compelling the military 
to use blind force. When force is employed it should be intelli-
gently directed, and this depends upon having reliable information 
in time. As Chief Justice John Marshall said of Washington, 
'A general must be governed by his intelligence and must regulate 
his 1neasures by his information. It is his duty 1n obtain correct 
information ...• ' So we take it as undeniable that the military, 
i.e. , the Army, need a certain amount of information in order to 
perfonn their constitutional and statutory missions. 11 444 F. 2d, 
at 953 (footnotes omitted). 
The system put into operation as a result of the Army's 1967 experi-
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activities that were thought to have at least some potential for civil disorder, 
I 
the reporting of that information to Army Intelligence headquarters at Fort 
I 
I 
Holabird, Maryland, the dissemination of these reports from headquarters 
! 





ip.formation in a computer data bank located at Fort Holabird. The information ,. 
\ 
itself was collected by a variety of means, but it is significant that the 
I 
principal source:> of information v.ere the news media and publications in 
general circulation. Some of the information came from Army Intelligen c e 
agents who attended meetings that were open to the public and who wrote field 
reports describing the meetings, giving such data as the name of the sponsoring 
organization, the identity of speakers, the approximate number of persons 
in attendance, and an indication of whether any disorder occurred. And still 
other information was provided to the Army by civilian law enforcement 
agencies. 
The rna terial filed by the government in the District Court reveals that 
Army Intelligence has field offices in various parts of the country; these ; " 
offices are staffed in the aggregate with approximately 1, 000 agents, 94% 
?:_I 
of whose timr is devoted to the organization's principal mission, which 
is unrelated to the domestic surveillance system here involved. 
2 
That principal mis sian was described in one of the docurnents filed 
with the district court as the conducting of llinvestigations to detern1ine 
whether uniformed men1bers of the Army, civilian employees [of the Arm.y) 
and contractors' en1.ployees should be granted access to classified information. 11 
(App. at 7 6-7 7. ) 
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By early 1970 Congress became concerned with the s c ope of the 
Army's domestic surveillance system; hearings on the matter were held 
before the Subc01nmittee on Constitutional Rights of the Sena~ Committee 
on the Judiciary. Meanwhile, the Army, in the course of a review of the 
system, ordered a significant reduction in its scope. For example, informa-
tion referred to in the complaint as the "blacklist" and the records in the 
computer data bank at Fort Holabird were found unnecessary and were 
destroyed, along with other related records. One copy of all the material 
relevant to the instant suit was retained, however, because of the pendency of 
this litigation. The review leading to the destruction of these records was said at 
the time the district court ruled on petitioners' motion to dismiss to be a 
"continuing" one (App. at 82), and the Army's policies at that tin:~ were re-
presented as follows in a letter from the Under Secretary of the Army to 
Senator Sam J. Ervin, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Rights: 
"[R]eports concerning civil disturbances will be limited to 
matters of immediate concern to the Army -- that is, re-
ports concerning outbreaks of violence or incidents with 
a high potential for violence beyond the capability of state 
and local police and the National Guard :.o control. These 
reports will be collected by liaison with other Government 
agencies and reported by teletype to the Intelligence Com-
mand. They will not be placed in a computer • . . • These 
reports are destroyed 60 days after publication or 60 days 
after the end of the disturbance. This limited reporting 
system will ensure that the Army is prepared to respond to 
whatever directions the President may is sue in civil dis-
turbanc e situations and without watching lawful activities of 






In briefs for petitbners filed with this Court, the Solicitor General 
has called our attention to certain directives issued by the Army and the 
Department of Defense subsequent to the District Court's dismissal of the 
action; these directives indicate that the Army's review of thk needs of its 
domestic intelligence activities has indeed been a continuing o~e and that 
those activities have since been significantly reduced. 
( 2) 
The Us trict Court held a combined hearing on respondents 1 motion 
for a prelim.:_ nary injunction and petitioners' motion for dismis s a 1 and 
thereafter announced its holding that respondents had failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. It was the view of the district court that 
respondents failed to allege any action on the part of the Army that was un-
lawful in it s elf and further failed to allege any injury or any realistic threats 
'}_/ 
to their rights growing out of the Army's actions. 
3._1 




cation from respondents' counsel as to the nature of the threats perceived by ; " • 
respondents; he asked what exactly it was in the Army's activities that tended 
to chill respondents and others in the exercise of their constitutional rights. 
Counsel responded that it was 
"precis ely the threat in this case that in some future civil disorder 
of some kind, the Army is going to come in with its list of trouble-
makers ... and go rounding up people and putting them in mili-
tary prisons somewhere." (Emphasis added) 
To this the court responded that "we still sit here with the writ of habeas corpus. '' 
At another point, counsel for respondents took a somewhat difference approach 
in arguing that 
"we're not quite sure exactly what they have in mind and that is pre-
cis ely what causes the chill, the chilling effect. 11 (Emphasis added.) 
-7-
I In reversing, the 0ourt of Appeals noted that respondents "have some 
I 
dtfficulty in establishing visible injury." They 
''freely admit that they complain of no sp_ecific action of the 
Army against them .... There is no evidence of illegal or 
unlawful surveillance activities. We are not cited to any 
clandestine intrusion by a military agent. So far as io yet 
shown, the information gathered is nothing more than a good 
newspaper reporter would be able to gather by attendance 
at public meetings and the clipping of articles from publica-
tions available on any newsstand. 11 444 F. Zd, at 953. 
The court tooknote of petitioners' argument "that nothing [detrimental to 
respondents] had been done, that nothing is contemplated to be done, and even 
if some action by the Army against [respondents] were possibly foreseeable, 
such would not present a presently justiciable controversy.'' With respect 
to this argument, the Court ofAppeals had this to say: 
"This position of the appellees [petitioners] does not accord full 
measure to the rather unique argument advanced by appellants 
[respondents]. While appellants do indeed argue that in the 
future it is possible that information relating to matters far beyond 
the responsibilities of the military 1nay be misued by the military 
to the detriment of these civilian appellants, yet appellants do 
not attempt to establish this as a definitely foreseeable event, or 
to base the i r complaint on this ground. Rather, appellants 
contend that the present existence of this system of gathering and 
distributing information, allegedly far beyond the mission 
requirement of the Army, constitutes an impermissible burden on 
appellants and other per sons similarly situated which exercises 
a present inhibiting effect on their full expression and utilization 
of their First Amendment rights ..•• 11 444 F. Zd, at 954. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
Our examination of the record satisfies us that the court of appeals 
properly identified the is sue presented, namely, whether the jurisdiction 
of a federal court may be invoked by a complainant who alleges that the 
; / 
exercise of his First Amendment rights is being chilled by the mere existence, 













that is alleged to be broader in scope than 1s reasonably necessary for the a c-
complislunent of a valid governmental purpose. We conclude, however, that, 
having properly identified the issue, the court of_ appeals decided that issue 
4/ 
incorrectly. 
In recent years this Court has found in a number of cases that consti-
tutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or "chilling, 11 effect of 
governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the 
exercise of First Amendment rights. ~, Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 
401 U . S. 1 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); 
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S . 301 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 
4 / 
Indeed, the court of appeals noted that it had reached a different 
conclusion when presented with a virtually identical issue in another of its 
recently decided cases, Davis v. Ichord, 442 F. 2d 1207 (CA-C. D. 1970). 
The plaintiffs in Davis were attacking the constitutionality of the House of 
Representatives Rule under which the House Committee on Internal Security 
conducts investigations and maintains files described by the plaintiffs as a 
11 political blacklist. 11 The court noted that any chilling effect to which the 
plaintiffs were subject arose from the mere existence of the Committee and 
its files and the mere possibility of the misuse of those files. In affirming 
the dismissal of the complaint, the court concluded that allegations of such 
a chilling effect could not be elevated to a justiciable claim merely by 
alleging as well that the challenged House Rule was overly broad and vague. 
In deciding the case presently under review, the court of appeals 
distinguished Davis on the ground that the difference in the source of the chill 
in the two cases -- a House Committee in Davis and the Army in the instant 
case -- was cont:r .olling. We cannot agree that the jurisdictional question 
with which we are here concerned is to be resolved on the basis of the identity 





377 U.S. 360 (1964). In none of these cases, however, did the chilling effect 
arise merely from the individual's knowledge that a governmental agency 
was engaged in certain activities or from the individual's con\omitant fea.r 
that, armed with the fruits of those activities, the agency migJt in the future 
take some other and additional action detrimental to that indi1dual. Rather, 
in each of thes~ cases, the challenged exercise of governmental power was 
regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the complainant was 
either presently or prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions, 
or compulsions that he was challenging. 
For example, the petitioner in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, had 
been denied admission to the bar solely because of her refusal to answer a 
question regarding the organizations with which she had been ass .ociated in 
the past. In announcing the judgment of the Court, Mr. Justice Black said 
that "a State may not inquire about a man's views or associations solely for 
the purpose of withholding a right or benefit because of what he believes. 11 
401 U.S., at 7. Some of the teachers who were the complainants in 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents had been discharged from employment by 
the State, and the others were threatened with such discharge, because of 
their political acts or as so cia tions. The Court concluded that the State 1 s 
"complicated and intricate scheme" of laws and regulations relating to 
teacher loyalty could not withstand constitutional scrutiny; it was not per-
missible to inhibit First Amendment expression by forcing a teacher to "guess 
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and might thereby 11 los c him his position. 11 385 U.S. , at 604. Lamont 
I 
vf Postmaster General dealt with a governmental regulation requiring 
private individuals to make a special written request to the Post Office for 
delivery of each individual mailing of certain kinds of political literature 
I 
addressed to them. In declaring the regulation invalid, the Court said: ''The 
addressee carries an affirmative obligation which we do not think the Government 
may impose on him. 11 381 U.S., at 307. Baggett v. Bullitt dealt with are-
quirement that an oath of vague and uncertain meaning be taken as a condition 
of employment by a governmental agency. The Court said: "Those with a 
conscientious regard for what they solemnly swear or affirm, sensitive to the 
perils posed by the oath's indefinite language, a void the risk of loss of employ-
ment, and perhaps profession, only by restricting their conduct to that which 
is unquestionably safe. Free speech may not be so inhibited. 11 377 U.S., at 
372. 
The decisions in these cases fully recognize that governmental action may 
be subject to constitutional chall e nge even though it has only an indirect effect 
on the exercise of First Amend1nent rights. At the same time, however, these 
decisions have in no way eroded the 
"established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke 
the judicia 1 power to determine the validity of executive or legis-
lative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately 
in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action 
•.•. " Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937). 
The respondents do not meet this test; their claim, simply stated, is that 




to the type and amount of information the Army needs and that the very 
existence of the Army's data-gathering system produces a constitutionally 
impermissible chilling effect upon the exercise of their First Amendment 
rights. That alleged "chilling" effect may perhaps be seen as arising from 
respondents' very perception of the system as inappropriate to the Army's 
role under our form of government, or as arising from respondents' beliefs 
that it is inherently dangerous for the military to be concerned with activities 
in the civilian sector, or as arising from respondents' less generalized yet 
speculative apprehensiveness that the Army may at some future date misuse 
ljj 
the information in some way that would cause direct harm to respondents. 
Allegations of a subjective "chill" are not an adequate substitute for a claim 
of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future ~arm; "the 
federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not 
render advisory opinions." United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 
89 (1947). 
lj_/ 
Not only have respondents left somewhat unclear the precise connection 
between the mere existence of the challenged system and their own alleged chill, 
but they have also cast considerable doubt on whether they themselves are in 
fact suffering from any such chill. Judge MacKinnon took cogent note of this 
difficulty in dissenting from the court of appeals' judgment, rendered as it was 
"on the facts of the case which emerge from the pleadings, affidavits and the 
admissions made to the trial court.'' 444 F.2d, at 959. At the oral argument 
before the district court, counsel for resporrl ents admitted that his clients 
were "not people, obviously, who are cowed and chilled"; indeed, they were 
quite willing "to open them.selves up to public investigation and public scrutiny. 11 
But, counsel argued, these respondents must "represent millions of Americans 
not nearly as forward [and] courageous" as themselves. It was Judge M.acKinnon 1 s 
view that this concession "constitutes a basic denial of practically their whole 
case. 11 Id. Even assuming a justiciable controversy, if respondents themselves 
are not chilled, but seek only to represent those "millions 11 whom they believe 
are so chilled, respondents clearly lack that "personal stake in the outcome 
















'i_/ (footnote cont 'd) 
As the Court recently observed in Moose Lodge No . . 1~7 v. Irvis, 
---------' a litigant "has standing to se ek redress for ~njuries done 
(1962). 







Stripped to its essentials, what respondents appear to be seeking is 
a broad scale investigation, conducted by themselves as private parties armed 
with the subpoena power of a federal district court and the power of eros s-
examination to probe into the Army's intelligence-gathering acf ivities, with 
the District Court determining at the conclusion of that investigation the extent 
to which tho s e activities may or may not be appropriate to the Army's mission. 
The following excerpt from the opinion of the Court of Appeals suggests the 
broad sweep implicit in its holding. 
"Apparently in the judgment of the civilian head of the Army not 
everything being done in the operation of this intelligence system 
was necessary to the performance of the military mission. I£ 
the Secretary of the Army can formulate and implement such 
judgment based on facts within his Departmental knowledge, the 
United States District Court can hear evidence, ascertain the 
facts, and decide what, if any further restrictions on the .com-
plained-of activities are called for to confine the military to 
their legitimate sphere of activity and to protect appellants' 
allegedly infringed constitutional rights." 444 F. 2d 947, 958. 
This, in effect, asserts that ''if the Executive can do it, courts can review it" --
a concept alien to the idea of co-equal branches absent specific present 
injury rather than a speculative future injury. This approach would have the 
federal. courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness 
of Executive action; such a role is appropriate for the Congress acting through 
its committees and the" power of the purse''; it is not the role of the judiciary. 
We, of course, intimate no view with respect to the propriety or 
desirability, from a policy standpoint, of the challenged activities of the De-
partment of the Army; our conclusion is a narrow one, namely, that on this 
















The concern of the Executive and Legislative branches in response 
tol disclosure of the Army surveillance activities -- and indeed the claims 
alleged in the complair!~ --reflects a traditional and strong resistance of 
I 
: 
Americans to any military intrusion into civilian affairs. That tradition 
has deep roots in our history and found early expression, for example, in 
I 
I 
the Third Amendment 1 s explicit prohibition against quartering soldiers in 
I 
private homes without consent and in the constitutional provisions for 
civilian control of the military. Those prohibitions are not directly pre-
sented by this case, but their philosophical underpinnings explain our tra-
ditional insistence on limitations on military operations in peacetime. 
Indeed, when presented with claims of judicially cognizable injury resulting 
from military intrusion into the civilian sector, federal courts ar.e fully 
empowered to consider claims of those asserting such injury; there is 
nothing in our Nation 1s history or in this Court 1s decided cases, including 
our holding tocJ ay, that can properly be seen as giving any indication that 
actual or threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities of the military 
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 8, 1972 
Re: No. 71-288 - Laird v. Tatum 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, . / 
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Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
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MEMO TO JUSTICE POWELL 
Re: No. 71-288, Laird v. Tatum 
The Chief's third draft, circulated yesterday, finally 
characterizes the complaint in this case accurately. It says 
that the issue is "whether the jurisdiction of a federal court 
may be invoked by a complainant who alleges that the exercise 
of his First Amendment rights is being chilled by the mere 
existence, without more, of a governmental investigative and 
data-gathering activity that is alleged to be broader in 
scope than is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of 
a valid governmental purpose." I would quibble with that statement 
in only one minor aspecto I think it is important that the 
investigative and data- gathering activity is being conducted 
by the Army because the Army has far greater poweres than 
other governmental a ge ncies and because this country has a 
strong tradition of keeping the Army out of civilian affairs. 
I think it should also be added that the complaint does not 
just a l lege that this activity is broader than is reasonably 
\ 
necessary to fulfill a valid purpose; i~lleg~his 
activity is illegal. You will recall that Sen. Ervin discussed 
this alleged illegality almost exclusively in his oral argument. 
Cl 
The Chief rejects the justi-..ability of this issue because 
he says the chilling effect is too speculative when applied to 
these particular litigants. He really says no more than that. 
He then attempts to distinguish other cases in which the Court 
has struck down governmental activity because of its chilling 
effect. Presumably in these cases the chilling effect is not 
-2-
merely speculative. But that is really not a means of distinguishing 
those cases for in each case there was a hearing on the merits 
in which actual evidence of what the government was doing and 
its effect or potential effect was put into the record. 
Naturally the injury in those cases was less speculative after 
a full hearing had been held than it is in this case in which 
the government has not even filed an answer. The question is, 
however, whether the complaints in those cases were less 
speculative. I don't propose to treat all four cases that the 
Chief cites but only two of them and one more which he ignores. 
~et v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), was an action 
brought by several teachers who opposed swearing a loyalty ---
oath required by the state of Washington. Despite the fact -
that the oath had been required since 1931 with apparently 
no oppressive effects the Court struck it down. Its vice 
as to 
was that it was vague/±R what groups teachers had to swear they 
would not associate with and as to what ideas teachers had to 
swear they would not teach or advocate. Mr. Justice White 
writing for the majority said: 
"The uncertain meanings of the oaths require the oath-
taker--teachers and public servants--to steer 'far wider 
of the unlawful zone,' ••• than if the boundaries of 
the forbidden areas were clearly marked. Those with a 
conscientious regard for what they solemnly swear or 
affirm, sensitive to the perils posed by the oath's 
indefinite language, avoid the riske of loss of employ-
ment, and perhaps profession, only by restricting their 
conduct to that which is unquestionably safe. Free 
speech may not be so inhibited." 
When the 64 teachers who brought the class action in Bagget 
alleged that the oath was vague and might chll the exercise 
of their First Amendment rights in the manner Justice White 
-3-
described, the injury they were alleging was just as speculative 
as the injury alleged in this case. Yet there is no question 
that the case was justiciable. No one was required to actually 
prove that he had been fired or otherwise punished because 
of the oath and his enga g ing in First Amendment activities. 
The mere existence of the oath itself was sufficient . to allow 
the teachers to sue and to require the government to offer 
a justification. I submit the case cannot be distinguished, 
~ """'-- ..... 
and I see nothing in the Chief's treatment on page 10 to 
distinguish it. 
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 u.s. 301 (1965), concerned 
a federal law whereby the ~ost Office would hold up mail which 
they ~egarded as Communist political propaganda and send the 
addressee a card. If he retyrned the card, thereby indicating 
that he wanted to recieve the mail, it was sent to him. The 
two appellants in the case sued the govenment instead of 
returning the cards. Theft~ claim was that the requirment of 
sending a card, thereby indicating that they wanted to recieve 
Communist political propaganda, might indentify them to the 
government and might have repercussions, similar to those 
feared by resps in this case. They made no showing that there 
were such repercussions a gainst anyone else so that the chilling 
effect on their First Amendment right to recieve written materials 
could be said to be more than speculative. Nevertheless, there 
was no question that their claim was not only justiciable 
but that they could prevail on the merits witho~showing any 
more. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, said: 
-4-
"We rest on the narrow ground that the addressee in order J/ 
to receive h is mail must request in writing that it be 
delivered. Tlis amounts in our jtld gment to an unconstitu-
tional abridgment of the addressee's First Amendment 
rights. The addressee carries an affirmative obligation 
which whe do not think the Government may impose on him, 
This requirement is almost certain to have a deterrent 
effect, especially as respects those who have sensitive . 
positions. Their livelihood may be dependent on a security 
clearance. Public official s, like schoolteachers who have 
no tenure, might think they would invite disaster if the 
read what the Federal Government says contains the seeds 
of treason. Apart from them, any addressee is likely 
to feel some inhibition in sending for literature which 
federal officilas have condemned as 'communist political 
propaganda." 
The Chief distinguishes Lamont by citing the "affirmative 
obligation" language set out above. But surely that is taken 
out of context. There is nothing wrong with placing an affirmative 
obligation on citizens. If for example eve ryone who received 
foreign mail had to send in a card, the case ¥Jould have been 
completely different. What was wrong wxx the government's 
having a way to identify persons who engaged in certain activities 
that had a poltical tinge disapproved by the majority of people 
in this country. Surely the result in Lamont would have been 
no different if the government simply made a list of all persoqs ' 
receiving "communits political propaganda" and then forwarded 
it on automaticallly. Therefore, the complaint in Lamo!l!_, 
which is the relative comparison, could not possibly have 
alleged any chilling ef f ect less specul ative than the chilling 
effect alleged here. 
Final ly, I want to turn to Justice Harlan's opinion for a 
unanimous Court in NAACP Yi_Alab~, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), a 
case which the Chief does not discuss. That case concerned 
an order by an Alabama court to the local chapter of the NAACP 
-5-
to produce a list of its membership. That order resulted in 
( ---
a contempt citation when the NAACP refused to comply. Before 
the Court, the NAACP raised the First Amendment rights of its 
members in defense to the contempt citation . The first important 
thing to note about the case is that the Court ruled that 
the NAACP had standing to raise the First Amendment rights of 
its members. 
"We think that petitioner argues more appropriately the 
rights of its members, and that its nexus with them is 
sufficient to permit that it act as their representative 
before this Court. In so concluding , we reject respondent's 
argument that the Association lacks standing to assert 
here constitutional rights pertaining to the members, 
who are not of course parties to the litigation." 
This was done because (1) the members claimed they had a right 
to remain ano~ymous, and making them assert their rights would 
of course destroy anopymaty and (2) because the result of 
discloure might chil l membership in the Association and thus 
woul d have an adverse effect on it . I t is important to note 
this aspect of the case because some of the plaintiffs in this 
litigation are organizations. I f there is a chilling effect, 
they should be able to assert in on behalf of their members 
since they are affected if participation in their meetings and 
rallies is diminished by government surveillance. Secondly, 
in a footnote, the Chief quotes the dissent below to the effect 
that these litigants are not chilled because they have asserted 
their rights. But in some cases, the organizations are asserting 
t he rights of their members who may very well be chilled--as 
is alleged--from asserting the rights as individuals. Third, 
this seems to me to contradict the Chief's assertion that a 
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litigant cannot ever assert the rights of another. This is 
of course true as a generality, but not in the area of the 
First Amendment ast Justice Harlan's opinion demonstrates 
and as the overbreadth doctrine, recently applied in Gooding 
v. Wil son, also demonstrates. 
The second thing about this case that should be noted is 
that the complaint a gain alleges that mereJy b~ revealing the 
names of its members to the state NNNX~xxkxxx might chill the 
exercise of First Amendment rights. 
" It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure 
of affiliation with groups engaged ina dvocacy may constitute 
as effective a restraint on freedom of association as the 
forms of governmental action in the cases above were thought 
likely to produce upon the particular constitutional 
rights there involved. This Court has recognized the 
vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy 
in one's association." 
Thus it would seem that the complaint in ~AACP v~_Al~Qama, 
about which there was no question as to justidicability, must 
also have alleged a chilling effect from governmental acquisition 
of knowledge as to membership. 
It should be kept in mind that a ruling that this complaiptr 
wxx is justiciable would not lead to a ruling that there was 
in fact a chilling effect. Tha~ must be proven, and it may 
well be that it cannot be proven in this case. Even if it 
is proven, it may not be sufficent to overide the governmental 
interest in surveillance. Thus, in NAACP v.!._.!~1?b9:,!lla , the 
chilling effect was found to outweigh the governmental interest 
after strong proof of its existence: 
" Petitioner has madean uncontrove:rted $hewing that on 
past occassions revelation of the ~dent~ty of its rank-
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and-file members has exposed these members to economic 
reprisal , loss of em~loyment, th~eat of.p~ysical coercion, 
and other manifestat~ons of publ~c host~l~ty. Under these 
circumstances, we think it apparent that compelled disclosure 
of petitironer's Alabama membership is likely to affect 
adversey the ability of petitioner and its members to 
pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which 
they admittely have the right to advocate, in that it 
may induce members to withdraw from the Association and 
dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure 
of their beliefs shown through their as sociations and of 
the consequences of this exposure." 
It may be that no such showing can be made in this case, but 
the point is that such showings of chill ing·•effect are to be 
proven at trial; they are not requirroto be shown before a 
trial can be held. 
The Chief's opinion does not i gnore the fact that there are 
cases in which a chilling effect has been a sufficient injury 
to not only permit a suit but to bring relief. He distinguishes 
all these cas~s in general by saying that "[i]n none of these 
cases, however, did the chilling effect arise merely from the 
individual's knowledge that a governmental a gency was engaged 
in certain activities or from the individual's concomitant 
fear that, armed with the fruits of those activites, the agency .... 
might in the future take some Qther and additional action 
detrimental to that individual." I do not think that statement 
is accurate. Surely that is precisely the x±x evil pointed 
out in these cases, particularly in Lamont where the chilling 
effect arose entirely out of the government's knowledge of 
who was receiveing Communist propaganda without any proof that 
the government misused that knowledge. 
The Chief goes on to . say that in all these cases the 
chal lenged exercise of governmental power was "regulatory, 
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proscripitive, or compulsory in nature, and the complaintant 
was either presently or prospectively subject to the regulations, 
proscripitions, or compulsions that he was challenging ." He 
does not indicate any reason why that makes a difference insofar 
as standing is concerned. Moroever, I am not even sure the 
distincition is accurate. Perhaps it is regulatory, proscriptive, 
or compulsory to require an affirmative statement of a desire 
to receive mail or to compel the disclosure of membership, 
but I am hardpressed to say which it is. But more importantly 
the evil in those cases was a result of the government's 
acquisition of information, and that is the same alleged evil 
in this case. Every case is different in some way or at some 
level, but I can see no distinction that is principled which 
removes this case from the large body of precedent that has 
recognized the existence of ? justiciable issue when it is 
alleged that governmental activity has a chilling effect on 
the exercise of First Amendment rights and that that e:fi:e 
activity is either illegal or insubstantial when compared to 
the chilling effect. That is precisely what the complaint in 
this case alleges. 
Fox 
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Memora.ndum of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST. 
Respondents in this case have moved that I disqualify 
myself from participation. While neither the Court nor 
any Justice individually appears ever to have done so, 
I have determined that it would be appropriate for me 
to state the reasons which have led to my decision with 
respect to respondents' motion. In so doing, I do not 
wish to suggest that I believe such a course would be 
desirable or even appropriate in any but the peculiar 
circumstances present here.1 
Respondents contend that because of testimony which 
I gave on behalf of the Department of Justice before 
the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Judi-
ciary Committee of the United States Senate at its 
1 In a motion of this kind, there is not apt to be anything akin to 
the "record" which supplies the factual basis for adjudication in 
most litigated matters. The judge will presumably know more 
about the factual background of his involvement in matters which 
form the basis of the motion thnn do the movants, but with the 
passage of any time at all his recollection will fade except to the 
extent it is refreshed by transcripts such as those available here. 
If the motion before me turned only on disputed factual inferences, 
no purpose would be served by my detailing my own recollection of 
the relevant facts. Since, howeYer, the main thru~t of respondents' 
motion is based on what seemH to me an incorrect interpretation of 
the applicable statute, I believe that this is the exceptional case 
where an opinion is warranted. 
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hearings on "Federal Data Banks, Computers and the 
Bill of Rights," and because of other statements I made 
in speeches related to this general subject, I should have 
disqualified myself from participating in the Court's 
consideration or decision of this case. The governing 
statute is 28 U. S. C. ~ 455 which provides: 
"Any Justice or judge of the United States shall 
disqualify himself in any case in which he has a 
substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has 
been a material witness, or is so related to or con-
nected with any party or his attorney as to render 
it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the 
trial, or appeal, or other proceeding therein." 
Respondents also cite various draft provisions of 
Standards of J uclicial Conduct prepared by a distinguished 
committee of the American Bar Association, and adopted 
by that body at its recent annual meeting. Since I do 
not read these particular provisions as being materially 
different from the standards enunciated in the congres-
sional statute, there is no occasion for me to give them 
separate consideration.~ 
Respondents in their motions summarize their factual 
contentions as follows: 
"Under the circumstances of the instant case, Mn.. 
JusTICE REHNQUIST's impartiality is clearly ques-
tionable because of his appearance as an expert wit-
ness for the Justice Department and Senate hearings 
inquiring into the subject matter of the case, be-
cause of his intimate knowledge of the evidence 
underlying the respondents' allegations, and because 
of his public statements about the lack of merit in 
respondents' claims." 
2 Sre Executive Hrport No. 91-92, 9bt Cong., 1~t Ses:;., Nomina-
tion of Clrmenl F. lbyn;;worth, .Jr., pp. 10-11. 
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Respondents are substantially correct in characterizing 
my appearance before the Ervin Subcommittee as an 
"expert witness for the Justice Department" on the sub-
ject of statutory and constitutional law dealing "·ith 
the authority of the Executive Branch to gather informa-
tion. They are also correct in stating that during the 
course of my testimony at that hearing, and on other 
occasions, I expressed an understanding of the law, as 
established by decided cases of this Court and of other 
courts, which "·as contrary to the contentions of re-
spondents in this case. 
Respondents' reference, ho,Yever, to my "intimate 
knowledge of the evidence underlying the respondents' 
allegations" seems to me to make a great deal of very 
little. When one of the Cabinet departments of the 
Executive Branch is requested to supply a witness for 
the congressional committee hearing devoted to a par-
ticular subject, it is generally confronted with a. minor 
dilemma. If it is to send a witness with personal knowl-
edge of every phase of the inquiry, there will be not one 
spokesman but a dozen. If it is to send one spokesman 
to testify as to the Department's position with respect 
to the matter under inquiry, that spokesman will fre-
quently be called upon to deal not only with matters 
within his own particular baili"·ick in the Department, 
but with those in other areas of the Department with 
respect to which his familiarity may be slight. I com-
men ted on this fact in my testimony before Senator 
Ervin's Subcommittee: 
"As you might imagine, the Justice Department, in 
selecting a witness to respond to your inquiries, had 
to pick someone who did not have personal knowl-
edge in every field. So I can simply give you my 
understanding .... " Hearings, p. 619. 
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There is one reference to the case of Taturn v. Laird 
in my prepared statement to the Subcommittee, and one 
reference to it in my subsequent appearance during a 
colloquy with Senator Ervin. The former appears as 
follows in the reported hearings: 
"However, in connection with the case of Tatum v. 
Laird, now pending in the U. S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit, one print-out 
from the Army computer has been retained for the 
inspection of the court. It will thereafter be 
destroyed." 
The second comment respecting the case was in a dis-
cussion of the applicable law with Senator Ervin, the· 
chairman of the Subcommittee, during my second 
appearance. 
My recollection is that the first time I learned of 
the existence of the case of Laird v. Tatum, other than 
having probably seen press accounts of it, was at the· 
time I was preparing to testify as a witness before the· 
Subcommittee in March 1971. I believe the case was 
then being appealed to the Court of Appeals by re-
spondents. The Office of the Deputy Attorney General, 
which is customarily responsible for collecting material 
from the various divisions to be used in preparing the 
Departme1r"s statement, advised me or one of my staff 
as to the arrangement with respect to the computer 
print-out from the Army Data Bank, and it was incor-· 
porated into the prepared statement which I read to 
the Subcommittee. I had then and have now no per-
sonal knowledge of the arrangement, nor so far as I 
know have I ever seen or been apprised of the contents 
of this particular print-out. Since the print-out had 
been lodged with the Justice Department by the De-
partment of the Army, I later authorized its transmittal 
to the staff of the subcommittee at the request of the· 
latter. 
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At the request of Senator Hruska, one of the members 
of the Subcommittee, I supervised the preparation of a 
memorandum of law ·which the record of the hearings 
indicates was filed on September 20, 1971. Respondents. 
refer to it in their petition, but no copy is attached, and 
the hearing records do not contain a copy. I \Yould 
expect such a memorandum to have commented on the 
decision of the Court of Appeals in Laird v. Tatum, 
treating it along with other applicable precedents in 
attempting to state \Yhat the Department thought the 
law to be in this general area. 
Finally, I never participated, either of record or in 
any advisory capacity, in the District Court, in the 
Court of Appeals, or in this Court, in the government's 
conduct of the case of Laird v. Tatum. 
Respondents in their motion do not explicitly relate 
their factual contentions to the applicable provisions of 
28 U. S. C. § 455. The so-called "mandatory" provi-
sions of that section require disqualification of a Justice 
or judge "in any case in which he has a substantial 
interest, has been of counsel, [or] is a material 
witness .... " 
Since I have neither been of counsel nor have I been 
a material witness in Laird v. Tatum, these provisions 
are not applicable. Respondents refer to a memoran-
dum prepared in the Office of Legal Counsel for the 
benefit of MR. JusTICE WHITE shortly before he came 
on the Court, relating to disqualification. I reviewed 
it at the time of my confirmation hearings and found 
myself in substantial agreement with it. Its principal 
thrust is that a Justice Department official is disqualified 
if he either signs a pleading or brief or "if he actively 
participated in any case even though he did not sign a 
pleading or brief." I agree: In both United Stales v. 
District Court,- U. S.- (1972), for which I was not 
officially responsible in the Department but with respect 
·. 
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to which I assisted in drafting the brief, and in S & E 
Contractors v. United States, - U. S. - (1972), in 
which I had only an advisory role which terminated im-
mediately prior to the commencement of the litigation, 
I disqualified myself. Since I did not have even an ad-
visory role in the conduct of the case of Laird Y. Tatum, 
the application of such a rule would not require or au-
thorize disqualification here. 
This leaves remaining the so-called discretionary por-
tion of the section, requiring disqualification where the 
judge "is so related to or connected with any party or 
his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for 
him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding 
therein." The interpretation and application of this sec-
tion by the various Justices who have sa.t on this Court 
seem to have varied widely. The leading commentator 
on the subject is John P. Frank, whose two articles, Dis-
qualification of Judges, 56 Yale Law Journal605 (1947), 
and Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh 
Bill, 35 Law and Contemporary Problems 43 (1970), 
contain the principal commentary on the subject. For 
a Justice of this Court who has come from the Justice 
Department, Mr. Frank explains disqualification prac-
tices as follows: 
"Other relationships between the Court and the De-
partment of Justice, however, might well be differ-
ent. The Department's problem is special because 
it is the largest law office in the world and has cases 
by the hundreds of thousands and lawyers by the 
thousands. For the most part, the relationship of 
the Attorney General to most of those matters is 
purely formal. As between the Assistant Attorneys 
General for the various departmental divisions, 
there is almost no connection." Frank, supra, 35-
Law & Contemporary Problems, at 47. 
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Indeed, different Justices who have come from the De-
partment of Justice have treated the same or very 
similar situations differently. In Schneiderman v. 
United States, 320 U. S. 118 (1943), a case brought and 
tried during the time Mr. Justice Murphy was Attorney 
General, but defended on appeal during the time that 
Mr. Justice Jackson was Attorney General, the latter 
disqualified himself but the former did not. 320 U. S., 
at 207. 
I have no hesitation in concluding that my tota.l lack 
of connection while in the Depa.rtment of Justice \Yith 
the defense of the case of Laird v. Tatum does not 
suggest discretionary disqualification here because of my 
previous relationship with the Justice Department. 
However, respondents also contend that I should dis-
qualify myself because I have previously expressed in 
public an umlerstanding of the ]a w on the question of the 
constitutionality of governmental surveillance. While 
no provision of the statute sets out such a provision for 
disqualification in so many words. it could conceivably 
be embraced "·ithin the general language of the discre-
tionary clause. Such a contention raises rather squarely 
the question of whether a member of this Comt, who 
prior to his taking that office has expressed a public 
view as to what the law is or ought to be, should later 
sit as a judge in a case raising that particular questiou. 
The present disqualification statute applying to Justices 
of the Supreme Court has been on the books only since 
1948, but its predecessor, applying by its terms only to 
district court judges, was enacted in 1911. Chief Justice 
Stone, testifying before the Judiciary Committee in 
1943, stated: 
"And it has always seemed to the Court that when 
a district judge could not sit in a case because of 
his previous association with it, or a. circuit court 
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of appeals judge, it was our manifest duty to take 
the same position." Hearings Before Committee 
on the Judiciary on H. R. 2808, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1943), quoted in Frank, supra, 56 Yale Law Jour-
nal, at 612. 
My impression is that none of the former Justices of 
this Court since 1911 have followed a practice of dis-
qualifying themselves in cases involving points of law 
with respect to which they had expressed an opinion or 
formulated policy prior to ascending to the bench. 
Mr. Justice Black while in the Senate was one of the 
principal authors of the Fair Labor Standards Act; 
indeed, it is cited in the 1970 edition of the United 
States Code as the "Black-Connery Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act." Not only did he introduce one of the early 
versions of the Act, but as Chairman of the Senate 
Labor and Education Committee he presided over· 
lengthy hearings on the subject of the bill and pre-
sented the favorable report of that Committee to the 
Senate. See S. Rep. No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1937). Nonetheless, he sat in the case which upheld 
the constitutionality of that Act, United States v. Darby, 
312 U. S. 100 (1941), and in later cases construing it,. 
including Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, UMW, 
325 U. S. 161 (1945). In the latter case, a petition for 
rehearing requested that he disqualify himself because 
one of his former law partners argued the case, and 
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter may be said to have 
implicitly criticized him for failing to do so.3 But to 
my knowledge his Senate role with respect to the Act 
was never a source of criticism for his participation in the 
above cases. 
Justice Frankfurter had, prior to coming to this Court, 
written extensively in the field of labor law. "The Labor 
3 See denial of petition for rphcnring in Jewel Ridge Coal Co1·p. 
v. Local6167, UMW, 325 U.S. 897 (l9..J.5) (.Jaekson, J., concmTing) .. 
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Injunction" which he and Nathan Green co-authored was 
considered a classical critique of the abuses by the fed-
eral courts of their equitable jurisdiction in the area of 
labor relations. Professor Sanford H. Kadish has stated: 
"The book \\"aS in no sense a disinterested inquiry. 
Its authors' commitment to the judgment that the 
labor injunction should be neutralized as a legal 
weapon against unions gives the book its energy and 
direction. It is, then, a brief, even a 'downright 
brief' as a critical reviewer would have it." Kadish, 
Labor and the Law, in Felix Frankfurter The Judge 
165 (W. Mendelson eel. 1964). 
Justice Frankfurter had not only publicly expressed his 
views, but had when a law professor played an important, 
perhaps dominant, part in the drafting of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. §§ 101-115. This 
Act was designed by its proponents to correct the abusive 
use by the federal courts of their injunctive powers in 
labor disputes. Yet in addition to sitting in one of the 
leading cases interpreting the scope of the Act, United 
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), Justice Frank-
furter wrote the Court's opinion. 
Justice Jackson in McGrath v. Christensen, 340 U. S. 
162 ( 1950), participated in a case raising exactly the 
same issue which he had decided as Attorney General (in 
a way opposite to that in which the Court decided it). 
340 U. S., at 176. Mr. Frank notes that Chief Justice 
Vinson, who had been active in drafting and preparing 
tax legislation while a member of the House of Repre-
sentatives, never hesitated to sit in cases involving that 
legislation when he was Chief Justice. 
Two years before he was appointed Chief Justice of 
this Court, Charles Evans Hughes wrote a book entitled 
The Supreme Court of the United States (Columbia 
University Press, 1928). In a chapter entitled "Liberty, 
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the doctrine expounded in the case of Adkins v. Chil-
dren 's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 ( 1922). I think that one 
would be warranted in saying that he implied some 
reservations about the holding of that case. See pp. 
205, 209-211. Nine years later, Chief Justice Hughes 
authored the Court's opinion in TV est Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1037), in which a closely divided 
Court overruled .Adkins. I have never heard any sug-
gestion that because of his discussion of the subject in 
his book he should have rerused himself. 
Mr. Frank summarizes his view of Supreme Court 
practice as to disqualification in the following words: 
"In short, Supreme Court Justices disqualify when 
they have a dollar interest; when they are related 
to a party and more recently, when they are related 
to counsel; and when the particular matter was in 
one of their former law offices during their associa-
tion; or, when in the government, they dealt with 
the precise matter and particularly with the precise 
case; otherwise, generally no." Frank, supra, 35 
Law & Contemporary Problems, at 50. 
Not only is the sort of public statement disqualifica-
tion upon " ·hich respondents rely not covered by the 
terms of the applicable statute, then, but it does not 
appear to me to be supported by the practice of previous 
J usticos of this Court. Since there is little con trolling 
authority on the subject, and since under the existing 
practice of the Court disqualification has been a matter 
of individual decision , I suppose that one who felt very 
strongly that public statcmen t disqualification is a highly 
desirable thing might find a 'va.y to road it into the 
discretionary portion of the statute by implication. I 
find little to commend tho concept on its merits, ho\\·ever, 
and I am, therefore, not disposed to construe the stat-
utory language to embrace it. 
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I do not doubt that a litigant in the position of 
respondents would much prefer to argue his case be-
fore a Court none of whose members had expressed 
the viev.'s that I expressed about the relationship be-
tween surveillance and First Amendment rights while 
serving as an Assistant Attorney General. I would 
think it likewise true that counsel for Darby would 
have preferred not to have to argue before Mr. Justice 
Black; that counsel for Christensen would have pre-
ferred not to argue before Mr. Justice Jackson; ·1 that 
coullsel for the United States would have preferred not 
to argue before Mr. J ustico Frankfurter; and that counsel 
for \Vest Coast Hotel Co. ''"ould have preferred a Court 
which dicl not include Chief Justice Hughes. 
The Term of this Court just past bears eloquent wit-
ness to tho fact that the Justices of this Court, each 
seeking to resolve close and difficult questions of con-
stitutional interpretation, do not reach identical results. 
The differences must be at least i11 some part due to 
differing jurisprudentia] or philosophica 1 propensities. 
Mrc JusTICE DouGLAS' statement about federal dis-
trict judges in his dissenting opinion in Chandler v. Judi-
cial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 137 (1970), strikes me as being 
equally true of the Justices of this Court: 
"Judges are not fungible; they cover the constitu-
tional spectrmn; and a particular j udgc's emphasis 
may make a "·orld of difference when it comes to 
rulings on evidence, the temper of the courtroom, 
the tolerance for the profferred defense, and the 
like. Lawyers recognize this when they talk about 
4 The fact that Mr. Ju~ticc Jackson reversed his earlier opinion 
a.fler sitting in Clu·istensen doc~ not seem to me to hear on tho 
disqualification issue. A judge will u~ually br requireu to make 
any decision as to di::;qualifica.tion before reachinp; any detcrminat ioll 
as to how he will vote if he doc.~ ~it. 
12 
71-288-MEMO 
LAIHD v. TATU{II 
'shopping' for a judge; Senators recognize this when 
they are asked to give their 'advice a.nd consent' 
to judicial appointments; laymen recognize this 
when they appraise the quality and image of the 
judiciary in their own community." 
Since most Justices come to this bench no earlier than 
their middle years, it would be unusual if they had not 
by that time formulated at least some tentative notions 
which would influence them in their interpretation of 
the sweeping clauses of the Constitution and their inter-
action with one another. It would be not merely un-
usual, but extraordinarv, if thev had not at least ~iven 
opinions as to constitution~! issues in their previous 
legal careers. Proof that a. J11stice's mind at the time 
he .ioined the Court w~s 11. comnlete tabula rasa in the 
area of com~titutionaJ adiuclir.ntion would be evidence of 
lack of ow=~ lifir.a.tion, not lack of bias. 
Yet whethf>r theRe opinions have become at all widely 
known m11v nPnPnd entirelv on happenstance. With re-
spect to tho~P who come hen• directly from private life, 
such comJ'Yl~=>r>+R or oniniom; mQv never have been publicly 
utterf>rl. Bnt it. wonlcl h~=> 1Jf'11R11Ftl if those coming from 
polir.v J'Yl!>lrin!J' nivi"ionR in thP F.ver.utive Branch, from 
the Renpt~=> nr TTon~e of 'R~=>nrpc;f>ntatives. or from posi-
tionR in c;+"tP g-overnment, hMl not divulged at least some 
hint of t'f-,,;r g-eneral a.nnrol'lr.h t.o public affairs, if not 
as to nFtrtil'nlF~r iRRnes of ll'lw. Indeed, the cJean~st case 
of all iR thF~t of ll .Tw<tice who comes to this Court from 
a lower rm1rt .. and has, while sitting as a judge of the 
lower rourt. hRd occasion to pass on an issue which later 
comes before this Court. No more compelling example 
could be found of a situation in which a Justice had 
previously committed himself. Y ct it is not and could 
not rationally be suggested that, so long as the cases be· 
different, a Justice of this Court should disqualify him-
self for that reason. Sec, e. g., the opinion of Mr. Jus-
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tice Harlan, joining in Lewis v. Manufacturers National 
Bank, 364 U. S. 603, 610 (1961). 
Mr. Frank sums the matter up this way: 
"Supreme Court Justices are strong minded men,. 
and on the general subject matters which come be-
fore them, they do have propensities; the course of 
decision cannot be accounted for in any other way." 
Frank, supra, 35 Law & Contemporary Problems, at 
48. 
The fact that some aspect of these propensities may 
have been publicly articulated prior to coming to this 
Court cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as anything 
more than a random circumstance which should not by 
itself form a basis for disqualification.5 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, I conclude that 
the applicable statute does not warrant my disqualifi-
cation in this case. Having so said, I would certainly 
concede that fair minded judges might disagree about the 
matter. If all doubts were to be resolved in favor of dis-
qualification, it may be that I should disqualify myself 
simply because I do regard the question as a fairly de-
batable one, even though upon analysis I would resolve 
it in favor of sitting. 
Here again, one's course of action may well depend 
upon the view he takes of the process of disqualification. 
Those federal courts of appeals which have considered 
the matter have unanimously concluded that a federal 
judge has a duty to sit where not disqualified which is. 
5 In terms of propriet~·. rather than disqualification, I would 
distinguish quite sharrll~· between a public statement made prior 
to nomination for the bench, on the one hnnd, and a public state-
ment made by a nominee to the bench. For the latter to express 
any but the most gem•ral observation about the law would sug-
gest that, in order to obtain fayorable con::;idrration of hi~ nomina-
tion, hr deliberatel.v was announcing in aclvanre, without benefit of 
jnclirinl oath, briefs, or argument, how he would deride a par-
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equally as strong as the duty to not sit where disquali-
fied. Edwards v. United States, 334 F. 2d 360, 362 
(CAS 1964); Tynan v. United States, 376 F. 2d 761 
(CADC 1967); In re Union Leader Corporation, 292 F. 
2d 381 (CAl 1961); Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F. 2d 121 
(CA2 1968); Simmons v. United States, 302 F. 2d 71 
(CA3 1962); United States v. Hoffa, 382 F. 2d 856 
(CA6 1967); Tucker v. Kerner, 186 F. 2d 79 (CA7 1950); 
Walker v. Bishop, 408 F. 2d 1378 (CA8 1969). These 
cases dealt with disqualification on the part of judges 
of the district courts and of the courts of appeals. I think 
that the policy in favor of the "equal duty" concept is 
even stronger in the case of a Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. There is no way of sub-
stituting Justices on this Court as one judge may be 
substituted for another in the district courts. There is 
no higher court of appeal which may review an equally 
divided decision of this Court and thereby establish the 
law for our jurisdiction. See, e. g., Tinker v. Des Moines 
School District, 258 F. Supp. 1971, affirmed by an 
equally divided court, 383 F. 2d 988 (CA8 1967), cer-
tiat·ari granted and judgment reversed, 393 U. S. 503 
( 1969). While it can seldom be predicted with confi-
dence at the time that a Justice addresses himself to 
the issue of disqualification whether or not the Court 
in a particular case will be closely divided, the disquali-
fication of one Justice of this Court raises the possibility 
of an affirmance of the judgment below by a11 equal1y 
divided Court. The consequence attending such a result 
is, of course, that the principle of law presented by the 
case is left unsettled. The undesirability of such a. dis-
position is obviously not a reason for refusing to dis-
qualify oneself where in fact one deems himself disquali-
fied, but I believe it is a reason for not "bending over 
backwards" in order to deem one's self disqualified. 
The prospect of affirmance by an equally divided 
Court, unsatisfactory enough in a single case, presents 
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even more serious problems where companion cases 
reaching opposite results are heard together here. Dur-
ing the six months in which I ha.ve sat as a Justice of 
this Court, there were at least three such instances.G 
Since one of tho stated reasons for granting certiorari 
is to resolve a conflict among other federal courts or 
state courts, the frequency of such instances is not 
surpnsmg. Yet affirmance of each of such conflicting 
results by an equally divided Court would lay down "one 
rule in Athens, and another rule in Rome" "·ith a ven-
geance. And since the notion of "public statement" dis-
qualification which I understand respondents to advance 
appears to have no ascertainable time limit, it is ques-
tionable when or if such an unsettled sta.te of the law 
could be resolved. 
The oath prescribed by 28 U. S. C. § 453 which is 
taken by each person upon becoming a member of the 
federal judiciary requires that he "administer justice 
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the 
poor and to the rich," that he "faithfully and impartially 
discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon 
[him]. . . agreeably to the Constitution and laws of 
the United States." Every litigant is entitled to have 
his case heard by a judge mindful of this oath. But 
neither the oath, the disqualification statute, nor the 
practice of the former Justices of this Court guarantee 
a litigant that each judge will start off from dead center 
in his willingness or ability to reconcile the opposing 
arguments of counsel with his understanding of the 
Constitution and the law. That being the case, it is 
not a ground for disqualification that a judge has prior 
to his nomination expressed his then understanding 
6 Branzburg v. II ayes, In re Pappas, and United States v. Cald-
well, - U. S. - (1972). Gelbard v. Uuited Stales and United 
States v. Egan, - U. S.- (1972). Airport A1tthm-ity v. Delta 
Airlines Inc. and Northeast Airli11es Inc. Y. Aeronautics Conmris-
sion, - U. S. - (1972). 
'· 
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of the meaning of some particular provision of the 
Constitution. 
Based on the foregoing considerations, I conclude that 
respondents' motion that I disqualify myself in this 
case should be, and it hereby is, denied.' 
7 Petitioners in Gravel v. United States, No. -, 0. T. 1971, 
have filed a petition for rehearing which asserts nH one of 1 he 
grounds that I should have disqualified my;;e!f in that ca.se. Be-
cause respondent;;' motion in Laird was addrc~sed to me, and 
because it seemed to me to be seriously and respon,« ibly urged, I 
have dealt with my reasons for denying it at some !0ngth. Because 
I believe that the petition for rehearing in Gravel, insofar as it 
deals with disqualification, possesses none of these charactrristics, 
thoro is no occasion for me to trea.t it in a similar manner. Since 
such motions have in the past been treated by the Court as being 
addressed to the individual Justice involved, however, I do venture 
the obsen·ation that in my opinion the petition insofar as it relates 
to di;;qualification verges on the frivolous. \Vhile my peripheral 
ad,·isory role in United States v. New York Times, - U. S. -
(1971), would have warranted disqualification had I been on the 
Court when that case was heard, it could not conceivably warrant 
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Memorandum of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST. 
Respondents in this case have moved that I disqualify 
myself from participation. While neither the Court nor 
any Justice individually appears ever to have done so, 
I have determined that it would be appropriate for me 
to state the reasons which have led to my decision with 
respect to respondents' motion. In so doing, I do not 
wish to suggest that I believe such a course would be 
desirable or even appropriate in any but the peculiar 
circumstances present here. 1 
Respondents contend that because of testimony which 
I gave on behalf of the Department of Justice before 
the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Judi-
ciary Committee of the United States Senate at its 
1 In a motion of this kind, there is not apt to be anything akin to· 
the "record" which supplies the factual basis for adjudication in 
mo t litigated matters. The judge will pre~umably know more 
about the factual background of his involvrment in matters which 
form the basis of the motion than do thr moYants, but with the 
passage of any time at all his recollection will fade except to the 
extent it is refreshed by transcripts such as those available here. 
If the motion brforc me turned only on eli ·puled factual inferences, 
no purpose would be sen·ed by my detailing my own recollection of 
the relevant facts . Since, however, the main thrust of respondents' 
motion is ba~rcl on what ~rrm~ to mr an incorrrct interpretation of 
t.lw applicable statute, I bclicYc thn t thi~ i~ 1 he exrepl ional case 
where an opinion iH warranted. 
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hearings on "Federal Data Banks, Computers and the 
Bill of Rights," and because of other statements I made 
in speeches related to this general subject, I should have 
disqualified myself from participating in the Court's 
consideration or decision of this case. The governing 
statute is 28 U. S. C. ~ 455 "·hich provides: 
"Any Justice or judge of the United States shall 
disqualify himself in any case in which he has a 
substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has 
been a material witness, or is so related to or con-
nected with any party or his attorney as to render 
it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the 
trial, or appeal, or other proceeding therein." 
Respondents also cite various draft provisions of 
Standards of Judicial Conduct prepared by a distinguished 
committee of the American Bar Association, and adopted 
by that body at its recent ammal meeting. Since I do 
not read these particular provisions as being materially 
different from the standards enunciated in the congres-
sional statute, there is no occasion for me to give them 
separate consideration." 
Respondents in their motions summarize their factual 
contentions as follows: 
"Under tho circumstances of the instant case, MR. 
JusTICE REHNQUIST's impartiality is clearly ques-
tionable because of his appearance as an expert wit-
ness for the Justice Department and Senate hearings 
inquiring into the subject matter of the case, be-
cause of his intimate knowledge of the evidence 
underlying the respondents' allegations, and because 
of his public statements about the lack of merit in 
respondents' claims." 
2 Sec Excruti\·e Report. Ko. 91-92, 9bl Cong., bt Sess., Nomina-
tion of Clement F. lfaynS\\·orlh, Jr., pp. 10-11. 
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Respondents are substantially correct in characterizing 
my appearance before the Ervin Subcommittee as an 
"expert witness for the Justice Department" on the sub-
ject of statutory and constitutional law dealing with 
the authority of the Executive Branrh to gather informa-
tion. They are also correct in stating that during the 
course of my testimony at that hearing, and on other 
occasions, 1 expressed an understanding of the law, as 
established by decided cases of this Court and of other 
courts, which "·as contrary to the contentions of re-
spondents in this case. 
Respondents' reference, however, to my "intimate 
knowledge of the evidence underlying the respondents' 
allegations" seems to me to make a great deal of very 
little. When one of the Cabinet departments of the 
Executive Branch is requested to supply a witness for 
the congressional committee hearing devoted to a par-
ticular subject, it is generally confronted with a minor 
dilemma. If it is to send a "·itness with personal knowl-
edge of every phase of the inquiry, there will be not one 
spokesman but a dozen. If it is to send one spokesman 
to testify as to the Department's position with respect 
to the matter under inquiry, that spokesman will fre-
quently be called upon to deal not only with matters 
within his own particular bailiwick in the Department, 
but with those in other areas of the Department with 
respect to which his familiarity may be slight. I com-
mented on this fact in my testimo11y before Senator 
Ervin's Subcommittee: 
"As you might imagine, the Justice Department, in 
selecting a witness to respond to your inquiries, had 
to pick someone who did not have personal knowl-
edge in every field. So I can simply give you my 
understanding .... " Hearings, p. 619. 
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There is one reference to the case of 'l'aturn v. Lairil 
in my prepared statement to the Subcommittee, and one 
reference to it in my subsequent appearance during a 
colloquy with Senator Ervin. The former appears as 
follows in the reported hearings: 
"However, in connection with the case of Taturn v. 
Laird, now pending in the U. S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit, one print-out 
from the Army computer has been retained for the 
inspection of the court. It will thereafter be 
destroyed." 
The second comment respecting the case was in a dis-
cussion of the applicable law with Senator Ervin, the· 
chairman of the Subcommittee, during my second 
appearance. 
My recollection is that the first time I learned of 
the existence of the case of Laird v. Tatum, other than 
having probably seen press accounts of it, was at the 
time I was preparing to testify as a witness before the 
Subcommittee in March 1971. I believe the case was 
then being appealed to the Court of Appeals by re-
spondents. The Office of the Deputy Attorney General, 
which is customarily responsible for collecting material 
from the various divisions to be used in preparing the 
Departrnent's statement, advised me or one of my staff 
as to the arrangement with respect to the computer 
print-out from the Army Data Bank, and it was incor-
porated into the prepared statement which I read to 
the Subcommittee. I had then and have now no per-
sonal knowledge of the arrangement, nor so far as I 
know have I ever seen or been apprised of the contents 
of this particular print-out. Since the print-out had 
been lodged with the Justice Department by the De-
partment of the Army, I later authorized its transmittal 
to the staff of the subcommittee at the request of the 
latter. 
- " . 
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At the request of Senator Hruska, one of the members 
of the Subcommittee, I supervised the preparation of a 
memorandum of law which the record of the hearings 
indicates was filed on September 20, 1971. Respondents 
refer to it in their petition, but no copy is attached, and 
the hearing records do not contain a copy. I would 
expect such a memorandum to have commented on the 
decision of the Court of Appeals in Laird v. Tatum, 
treating it along with other applicable precedents in 
attempting to state what the Department thought the 
law to be in this general area. 
Finally, I never participated, either of record or in 
any advisory capacity, in the District Court, in the 
Court of Appeals, or in this Court, in the government's 
conduct of the case of Laird v. Tatum. 
Respondents in their motion do not explicitly relate 
their factual contentions to the applicable provisions of 
28 U. S. C. § 455. The so-called "mandatory" provi-
sions of that section require disqualification of a Justice 
or judge "in any case in which he has a substantial 
interest, has been of counsel, [or] is a material 
witness .... " 
Since I have neither been of counsel nor have I been 
a material witness in Laird v. Tatum, these provisions 
are not applicable. Respondents refer to a memoran-
dum prepared in the Office of Legal Counsel for the 
benefit of MR. Jus1'ICE WHITE shortly before he came 
on the Court, relating to disqualification. I reviewed 
it at the time of my confirmation hearings and found 
myself in substantial agreement with it. Its principal 
thrust is that a Justice Department official is disqualified 
if he either signs a pleading or brief or "if he actively 
participated in any case even though he did not sign a 
pleading or brief." I agree. In both United States v. 
District Court,- U.S.- (1972), for which I was not 
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to which I assisted in drafting the brief, and in S & E 
Contractors v. United States, - U. S. - (1972), in 
which I had only an advisory role which terminated im-
mediately prior to the commencement of the litigation, 
I disqualified myself. Since I did not have even an ad-
visory role in the conduct of the case of Laird v. Tatum, 
the application of such a rule would not require or au-
thorize disqualification here. 
This leaves remaining the so-called discretionary por-
tion of the section, requiring disqualification where the 
judge "is so related to or connected with any party or 
his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for 
him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding 
therein." The interpretation and application of this sec-
tion by the various Justices who have sat on this Court 
seem to have varied widely. Tho leading commentator 
on tho subject is John P. Frank, whose two articles, Dis-
qualification of Judges, 56 Yale Law Journal605 (1947), 
and Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh 
Bill, 35 Law and Contemporary Problems 43 ( 1970), 
contain the principal commentary on the subject. For 
a Justice of this Court who has come from the Justice 
Department, Mr. Frank explains disqualification prac-
tices as follows: 
"Other relationships between the Court and tho De-
partment of Justice, however, might well be differ-
ent. The Department's problem is special because 
it is the largest law office in the world and has cases 
by the hundreds of thousands and lawyers by the 
thousands. For the most part, the relationship of 
the Attorney General to most of those matters is 
purely formal. As between the Assistant Attorneys 
General for the various departmental divisions, 
there is almost no connection." Frank, supra, 35· 
Law & Contemporary Problems, at 47. 
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Indeed, different Justices who ha.ve come from the De-
partment of Justice have treated the same or very 
similar situations differently. In Schneiderman v. 
United States, 320 U. S. 118 (1943), a case brought and 
tried during the time Mr. Justice Murphy was Attorney 
General, but defended on appeal during the time that 
Mr. Justice Jackson '"as Attorney General, the latter 
disqualified himself but the former did not. 320 U. S., 
at 207. 
I have no hesitation in concluding that my total lack 
of connection while in the Department of Justice with 
the defense of the case of Laird v. Tatum does not 
suggest discretionary disqualification here because of my 
previous relationship with the Justice Department. 
However, respondents also contend that I should dis-
qualify myself because I have previously expressed in 
public an understanding of the la\\" on the question of the 
constitutionality of governmental surveillance. While 
no provision of the statute sets out such a provision for 
disqualification in so many words, it could conceivably 
be embraced within the general language of the discre-
tionary clause. Such a contention raises rather squarely 
the question of whether a member of this Court, who 
prior to his taking that office has expressed a public 
view as to what the law is or ought to be, should later 
sit as a judge in a case raising that particular question. 
The present disqualification statute applying to Justices 
of the Supreme Court has been on the books only since 
1948, but its predecessor, applying by its terms only to 
district court judges, was enacted in 1911. Chief Justice 
Stone, testifying before the Judiciary Committee in 
1943, stated: 
"And it has always seemed to the Court that when 
a district judge could not sit in a case because of 
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of appeals judge, it was our manifest duty to take· 
the same position." Hearings Before Committee 
on the Judiciary on H. R. 2808, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1943), quoted in Frank, supra, 56 Yale Law Jour-
nal, at 612. 
My impression is that none of the former Justices of 
this Court since 1911 have followed a practice of dis-
qualifying themselves in cases involving points of law 
with respect to which they had expressed an opinion or 
formulated policy prior to ascending to the bench. 
Mr. Justice Black while in the Senate wa.s one of the 
principal authors of the Fair Labor Standards Act; 
indeed, it is cited in the 1970 edition of the United 
States Code as the "Black-Connery Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act." Not only did he introduce one of the early 
versions of the Act, but as Chairman of the Senate 
Labor and Education Committee he presided over 
lengthy hearings on the subject of the bill and pre-
sented the favorable report of that Committee to the 
Senate. Sec S. Rep. No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 
( 1937). Nonetheless, he sat in the case which upheld 
the constitutionality of that Act, United States v. Darby, 
312 U. S. 100 (1941), and in later cases construing it, 
including Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, UMW, 
325 U. S. 161 (1945). In the latter case, a petition for 
rehearing requested that he disqualify himself because· 
one of his former law partners argued the case, and 
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter may be said to have 
implicitly criticized him for failing to do so.3 But to 
my knowledge his Senate role with respect to the Act 
was never a source of criticism for his participation in the 
above cases. 
Justice Frankfurter had, prior to coming to this Court, 
written extensively in the field of labor Jaw. "The Labor 
3 Sco denial of petition for rehe<lring in Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. 
v. Local6167, UMW, 325 U.S. 897 (1945) (.Jad:~on, J ., concurrillg). 
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Injunction" which he and Nathan Green co-au tho red was 
considered a classical critique of the abuses by the fed-
eral courts of their equitable jurisdiction in the area of 
labor relations. Professor Sanford H. Kadish has stated: 
"The book was in no sense n, disinterested inquiry. 
Its authors' commitment to the judgment that the 
labor injunction should be neutralized as a legal 
wen,pon against unions gives the book its energy and 
direction. It is, then, a brief, even a 'downright 
brief' as a critical reviewer would have it." Kadish, 
Labor and the Lav,·, in Felix Frankfurter The Judge 
165 (W. Mendelson ed. 1964). 
Justice Frankfurter had not only publicly expressed his 
views, but had when a law professor played an important, 
perhaps dominant, pn,rt in the drafting of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 20 U.S. C. §§ 101- 115. This 
Act was designed by its proponents to correct the abusive 
use by the federal courts of their injunctive po,vers in 
labor disputes. Yet in addition to sitting in one of the · 
leading cases interpreting the scope of the Act, United 
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), Justice Frank-
furter wrote the Court's opinion. 
Justice Jackson in McGrath v. Christensen, 340 U. S. 
162 ( 1950), participated in a case raising exactly the 
same issue which he had decided as Attorney General (in 
a way opposite to that in which the Court decided it). 
340 U. S., at 176. Mr. Frank notes that Chief Justice 
Vinson, who had been active in drafting and preparing 
tax legislation while a member of the House of Repre-
sentatives, never hesitated to sit in cases involving that 
legislation when he was Chief Justice. 
Two years before he was appointed Chief Justice of 
this Court, Charles Evans Hughes wrote a book entitled 
The Supreme Court of the United States (Colurnbia 
University Press, 1928). In a chapter entitled "Liberty, 
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the doctrine expounded in the case of Adkins v. Chil-
dren's Hospilal, 261 U.S. 525 (1922). I think that one 
would be warranted in saying that he implied some 
reservations about the holding of that case. See pp. 
205, 209-211. Nino years later, Chief Justice Hughes 
authored tho Court's opinion in West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 ( 1937), in which a closely divided 
Court overruled A dlcins. I have never heard any sug-
gestion that because of his discussion of the subject in 
his book he should have recused himself. 
Mr. Frank summarizes his view of Supreme Court 
practice as to disqualification in the following words: 
"In short, Supreme Court Justices disqualify when 
they have a dollar interest; when they are related 
to a party and more recently, when they are related 
to counsel; and when the particular matter was in 
one of their former law offices during their associa-
tion; or, when in the government, they dealt with 
the precise matter and particularly ·with the precise 
case; otherwise, generally no." Frank, supra, 35 
Law & Contemporary Problems, at 50. 
Not only is the sort of public statement disqualifica-
tion upon which respondents rely not covered by the 
terms of the applicable statute, then, but it does not 
appear to me to be supported by tho practice of previous 
Justices of this Court. Since there is little controlling 
authority on tho subject, and since under the existing 
practice of the Court disqualification has been a matter 
of individual decision, I suppose that one who felt very 
strongly that public statement disqualification is a highly 
desirable thing might find a way to road it into the 
discretionary portion of the statute by implication. I 
find little to commend tho concept on its merits, ho\\'ovor, 
and I am, therefore, not disposed to construe the stat-
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I do not doubt that a litigant in the position of 
respondents would much prefer to argue his case be-
fore a Court none of whose members had expressed 
the views that I expressed about the relationship be-
tween surveillance and First Amendment rights while 
serving as an Assistant Attorney General. I would 
think it likewise true that counsel for Darby iYOuld 
have preferred not to have to argue before Mr. Justice 
Black; that counsel for Christensen would have pre-
ferred not to argue befon' Mr. Justice Jackson; 4 that 
counsel for the United States would have preferred not 
to argue before Mr. Justice Frankfurter; and that counsel 
for \Vest Coast Hotel Co. would have preferred a Court 
"·hich did not include Chief Justice Hughes. 
The Term of this Court just past bears eloquent wit-
ness to the fact that the Justices of this Court, each 
seeking to resolve close aml difficult questions of con-
stitutional interpretation, do not reach identical results. 
The differences must be at least in some part due to 
differing jurisprudential or philosophical propensities. 
Mn.. Jus'l'ICE DouGLAs' statement about federal dis-
trict judges in his dissenting opinion in Chandler Y. Judi-
cial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 137 (1970), strikes me as being 
equally true of the Justices of this Court: 
"Judges are not fungible; they cover the constitu-
tional spectrum; and a particular judge's emphasis 
may make a "·orld of difference when it comes to 
rulings on evidence, the temper of the courtroom, 
the tolerance for the profferred defense, and the 
like. Lawyers recognize this when they talk about 
4 The fact that Mr. Justice Jackson rcn'rsed his earlier opinion 
n.ftcr sitting in Christensen doc~ not ~crm to nw to hr~1 r on 1 he 
di~()ualificn.tion issue. A judge will u~naJJ~· hr required to mnkc 
any decision as to dis()ualification before reaching any dctcrminnt ion 
as to how he will vote if he doc.,; Fit. 
12 
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'shopping' for a judge; Senators recognize this when 
they are asked to give their 'advice and consent' 
to judicial appointments; laymen recognize this 
when they appraise the quality and image of the 
judiciary in their own community." 
Since most Justices come to this bench no earlier than 
their middle years, it would be unusual if they had not 
by that time formulated at least some tentative notions 
which would influence them in their interpretation of 
the sweeping clauses of the Constitution and their inter-
action with one another. It would be not merely un-
usual, but extraordinary, if thev had not at least given 
opinions as to constitutional issues in their previous 
legal careers. Proof that a Jnstice's mind at the time 
he joined the Court was R complete tabula rasa in the 
area of constitutional acl .iuclicfltion would be evidence of 
lack of quft lification, not lack of bias. 
Yet whether these opinions ha.ve become at all widely 
known m11v depend entirelv on happenstance. With re-
spect to thoRe who come hf're clirectly from private life, 
such comnwnts or opinions mav nr.ver have been publicly 
uttered. "Rnt it would hf' unnsn:1l if those coming from 
policv TYH,lrinq divisions in thP "F'.xecutive Branch, from 
the Senptp nr Hom;e of Rf'nreRentatives, or from posi-
tions in f'lt"tA !!"overnment hacl not divulged at least some-
hint of thPi ... general annroach to public affairs, if 11ot 
as to nftrtil'nlRr issues of law. Indeed, the clearest case 
of all is th11t of a Justice who comes to this Court from 
a lower conrt. and has, while sitting as a judge of the 
lower court, had occasion to pass on an issue which later 
comes before this Court. No more compelling example· 
could be found of a situation in which a Justice had 
previously committed himself. Yet it is not and could 
not rationa.lly be suggested that, so long as the cases be· 
different, a Justice of this Court should disqualify him-
self for that reason. See, e. g., the opinion of Mr. Jus-· 
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tice Harlan, joining in Lewis v. Manufacturers National 
Bank, 354 U. S. 503, 610 (1961). 
Mr. Frank sums the matter up this way: 
"Supreme Court Justices are strong minded men, 
and on the general subject matters which come be-
fore them, they do have propensities; the course of 
decision camJOt be accounted for in any other way." 
Frank, supra, 30 Law & Contemporary Problems, at 
48. 
The fact that some aspect of these propensities may 
have been publicly articulated prior to coming to this 
Court cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as anything 
more than a random circumstance which should not by 
itself form a basis for disqualification." 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, I conclude that 
the applicable statute does not warrant my disqualifi-
cation in this case. Having so said, I would certainly 
concede that fair mindrd judges might disagree about the 
matter. If all doubts were to be resolved in favor of dis-
qualification, it may be that I should disqualify myself 
simply because I do regard the question as a fairly de-
batable one, even though upon analysis I vvould resolve 
it in favor of sitting. 
Here again, one's course of action may well depend 
upon the view he takes of the process of disqualification. 
Those federal courts of appeals which have considered 
the matter have unanimously concluded that a federal 
judge has a duty to sit IYhere not disqual·ified w·hich is 
5 In terms of propriet~·, rat her than di:;qualification , I would 
distinguish quite shnrpl:-· hclwecn a public statement made prior 
to nomination for the bench , on the one hand, and a public state-
ment made by a nominee to the bench. For the latter to express 
any but the most general obsen·ation about the law would sug-
~re~t that, in order to obtain favorable consiclcmtion of hi~ nomina-
tion, he clelibcratelr was announcing in nd,·anre, without hrncfiL of 
judicial oath, briefs, or argument, hO\Y he would deride a par-
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equally as strong as the duty to not sit where disquali-
fied. Edwards v. United States, 334 F. 2d 360, 362 
(CA5 1964); Tynan v. United States, 376 F. 2d 761 
(CADC 1967); In re Union Leader Corporation, 292 F. 
2d 3Sl (CAl 1961); Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F. 2d 121 
(CA2 196S); Simmons v. United States, 302 F. 2d 71 
(CA3 1962); United States v. Hoffa, 3S2 F. 2d S56 
(CA6 1967); Tucker v. Kerner, 186 F. 2d 79 (CA7 1950); 
Walker v. Bishop, 40S F. 2d 137S (CAS 1969). These 
cases dealt with disqualification on the part of judges 
of the district courts and of the courts of appeals. I think 
that the policy in favor of the "equal duty" concept is 
even stronger in the case of a Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. There is no way of sub-
stiliuting Justices on this Court as one judge may be 
substiliuted for another in the district courts. There is 
no higher court of appeal which may review an equally 
divided decision of this Court and thereby establish the 
law for our jurisdiction. Sec, e.(]., 'Pinker v. Des Moines 
School District, 25S F. Supp. 1971, affirmed by an 
equally divided court, 3S3 F. 2d 9SS (CAS 1967), cer-
tiorari granted and judgment reversed, 393 U. S. 503 
(1 969). While it can seldom be predicted with confi-
dence ali the time that a Justice addresses himself to 
the issue of disqualification whether or not the Court 
in a particular case will be closely divided, the disquali-
fication of one Justice of this Court raises the possibility 
of au affirmance of the judgment below by an equally 
divided Court. The consequence attending such a result 
is, of course, that the principle of law presented by the 
case is left unsettled. The undesirability of such a dis-
position is obviously not a reason for refusing to dis-
qualify oneself where in fact one deems himself disquali-
fied, but I believe it is a reason for not "bending over 
backwards" in order to deem one's self disqualified. 
The prospect of affirmance by an equally divided 
Court, unsatisfactory enough in a single case, presents 
71-288-MEMO 
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even more serious problems where companion cases 
reaching opposite results are heard together here. Dur-
ing the six months in which I have sat as a Justice of 
this Court, there were at least three such instances.6 
Since one of the stated reasons for granting certiorari 
is to resolve a conflict among other federal courts or 
state courts, the frequency of such instances is not 
surpnsmg. Yet affirmance of each of such conflicting 
results by an equally divided Court would lay down "one 
rule in Athens, and another rule in Rome" with a ven-
geance. And since the notion of "public statement" dis-
qualification which I understand respondents to advance 
appears to have no ascertainable time limit, it is ques-
tionable when or if such an unsettled state of the law 
could be resolved. 
The oath prescribed by 28 U. S. C. ~ 453 which is 
taken by each person upon becoming a member of the 
federal judiciary requires that he "administer justice 
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the 
poor and to the rich," that he "faithfully and impartially 
discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon 
[him]. . . agreeably to the Constitution and la"·s of 
the United States." Every litigant is entitled to have 
his case heard by a judge mindful of this oath. But 
neither tho oath, the disqualification statute, nor the· 
practice of the former Justices of this Court guarantee 
a litigant that each judge will start off from dead center 
in his willingness or ability to reconcile the opposing 
arguments of counsel with his understanding of the 
Constitution and the law. That being the case, it is 
not a ground for disqualification that a judge has prior 
to his nomination expressed his then understanding 
6 Branzburg v. I! ayes, In rc Pappas, and United States v. Cald-
well,- U. S.- (1972). Gelba.rd v. United States and United 
States v. Egan, - U. S. - (1972). Airport Authority v. Delta 
Airlines Inc. and Northeast Airlines Inc. v. Aeronautics Commis-
sion, - U. S. - (1972). 
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of the meaning of some particular provision of the 
Constitution. 
Based on the foregoing considerations, I conclude that 
respondents' motion that I disqualify myself in this 
case should be, and it hereby is, deniecl. 7 
7 Petitioners in Gravel v. United States, No. -, 0. T. 1971, 
lun·e filed a petition for rchea ring whirh a~~erts a::: one of the 
grounds that I should have disqualified my~elf in that case. Be-
cause respondents' motion in Laird w11s addressed to me, and 
because it seemed to mo to be seriously and responsibly urged, I 
have dealt with my reasons for denying it at some length. Because 
I believe that the petition for rehearing in Gravel, insofar as it 
deal:; with disqualification, possesses none of these characteristics, 
there is no occasion for me to trea.t it in a similar manner. Since 
such motions have in the past been treated by the Court as being 
addressed to the individual Justice involved, however, I do venture 
the observation that in my opinion the petition insofar as it relates 
to disqualification verges on the fri \·olous. While my peripheral 
advi~ory role in United States v. New York Timrs, - U. S.-
( 1971), would have warranted disqna lification had I been on the 
Court when that case was heard, it. could not conceivably warrant 
disqualifica,tion in Gravel, a different case raising entir-ely different 
constilution::tl issues. 
6/10/72--LAH 
Rec Laird v. Tatum, No. 71-288 
Judge a 
I have read Phil's recent memo to you regarding the 
3d draft of Justice Burger's opinion in this case. Since, 
in the course of my research in Healy v. James, I have become 
familiar with many of the recent First Amendment precedents 
that are involved in this case, I would like to add a word 
or two to his note. 
First, Phil cites the NAACP v. Alabama case, the unanie 
mous Harlan opinion on which we rely in Healy. That case is 
merely one important case in a longer string of precedent 
establishing that there is most surely a cognizable First 
Amendment interest in disclosing membership lists and 
divulging associations. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel Gre-
million v. NAACPP 366 U.S. 293 (1961) (state law requiring 
annual filing of list of officers and members of NAACP held 
violative of 1st A.); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 u.s. 479 (1960) 
(state law requiring teachers to file list of organizations 
with which they are affiliated held unconstitutional); Bates 
v. City of Little Rock, 361 u.s. 516 (1960) (municipal ord-
inance requiring NAACP to file lists of members and con-
tributors found unconstitutional• This case is particular-
ly instructive because Justice Stewart noted that the 
interference with First A. Rts was not direct or terribly 
oppressive, but he concluded that "freedoms such as these are 
protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, 
but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental 
interference."); Gibson v. Florida Investigating Committee, 
--2--
372 U.S. 539 (1963) (state investigating committee may not 
inquire into membership lists of local branch of NAACP). 
What all these cases seem to make unmistakably clear 
is that there exists a rather well defined process of consti• 
tutional adjudication under the First Amendment. First, the 
persons complaining of an infringement of protected first 
amerldment interests must allege their injury. While it 
is conceivable that i~lll cases may arise in which the 
alleged interference is so slight and so thoroughly in-
substantial as to warrant summary disposition, those cases 
are rare and this case is certainly not in that category. 
Phil has stated the most significant point• in making this 
threshold determination it makes absolutely no difference 
whether the governmental intrusion is "legal" or "illegal" 
in terms of whether there is constitutional or statutory 
authorization for that interference. Setting aside the 
qeestion whether the interference is "legal," I am baffled 
by the notion that these individuals did not state a 
sufficient basis for raising a first amendment question. 
All of the membership casesp as Phil points outp deal with 
the prospect that some use will be made at some future time 
of the mist of affiliations. One needs not reflect very 
deeply to conclude that the knowledge that one 0 s activities 
are being monitored, and a file kept on his statements, 
personal associations and affiliations may have a present 
and direct inhibitory impact on free speech. 
Th . +~Q..h . . 1:.. h h" 1" . . ~s11 t e po~nt at W1"1~c t ~s ~t~gat~on was short -
circuited in the DC, and the CA was right, in my view, to 
have ordered the case returned to the DC. Only then, having 
--3--
once established the existence of a first amendment interest, 
may the case proceed to the 2d and 3d cinsiderations in 
the traditional adjumicatory process. Only then can a 
court adequately determine whether there exists some 
legitimate purpose for the governmental action. And, if 
such a legitimate purpose is found, only then can it be 
l determined whether the government's action is limited to 
J effecting the government 0 s inerest in the narrowest 
/ manner, involving the least conflict with protected 
speech. 
The CJ gas confused these latter two points with the 
question of threshold justiciability. If the CA judgment 
were affirmed I have little doubt that, ultimately, the 
case would be won by the government. Butv it would not 
be won, and should not be won, on the ground that there is 
no cognizable first amendment interest implicated by the 
government surveillance scheme. It could be won on the 
ground that the government interest is substantial and 
legitimate and it is circumscribed so that it is not 
broadly intrusive into protected speech. The case could 
also be won by the government on the conclusion that the 
case is now moot in light of the vast restrictions apparently 
recently imposed on the government 0 s surveillance. 
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.hp:tmt OJ4tUri Df ti(t 1lritb ... ' 
.... Jrtqhru. ~. <IJ. 211~,., 
June 12, 1972 
Re: No. 71-288 - Laird v. Tatum 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
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'J!thtlilirfn.gtou, p. QJ. 2!1[3)L$ 
JUSTICC HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
June 12, 1972 
Re: No. 71-288 - Laird v. Tatum. 
Dear Chief: 
Please join 1ne in your third draft recircu-
lation of June 8. 
Sincerely, 
;I u. JJ. 
The Chief Justice 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u.prtutt <!fcurl cf tlrt 'Jlinittb ~ht!ts 
-.asfringhm. ~. <!f. 2llgt~$ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re : No. 71-288 - Laird v. Tatum 
September 27, 1972 
There is presently pending before the Court a petition 
for rehearing in this case, asserting inter alia that I 
should have disqualified myself from participating. There 
is also pending before me a separate motion of the respondents 
in the case, addressed to me as an individual Justice, 
requesting that I disqualify myself. 
It is my present intention to file with the Clerk, 
on the day on which the first Order List is released, the 
attached Chambers opinion denying the motion of respondents 
in this case addressed to me as an individual Justice. The 
proposed Chambers opinion refers in a footnote on its last 
page to the petition for rehearing in Gravel v. United States, 
in which it is likewise asserted that I should have disqualified 
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The central issue in this case is whether the BRJ!!xk Depart-
ment of Defense has the authority under the Constitution and 
t-t-l 
applicable law1 to collect and disseminate intelligence information 
related to possible civil violence or disturbances. It may "88 Ri'h~d 
eJR8ti'WR. Respondents characterized the activity in question as 
"surveillance of lawful and peaceful political activities. " Petitioners 
refer to it e'!'8~Q),;r as domestic intelligence activity or • the 
"collection/ Jf civil B:it disturbance-related information. " I will 
use the latter terminology, or variations of it, as it seems to 
me more accurately to reflect the true nature of the activity. 
But whatever it may be called, the essential facts - as reflected 
2. 
in the complaint, exhibits and affidavits - are not in dispute and 
are summarized in Judge Willkie's opinion below. 
:c. 
It may help, nevertheless, to put this case in proper 
perspect ive by identifying the role and responsibility of government 
with respect to the problem involved. The defendants in this case 
are the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the 
Chief of Staff of the Army, and the commanding general of the 
U. S. Army Intelligence Command. Although there is a good deal 
of rhetoric in this case~ about the J:itary~ 
its intrusions upon ~civilian activities, the fact is that 
a..c.~h.( 
~~~~-...t J.. ....... _...; ~ ; ~ 
e responsib1 1 rest~ .........,t with any amorphous "the military" 
or any specific members of the Armed Services. Rather, it rests 
explicitly under the Constitution and laws of this country upon the 
civilians who are appointed by the President, confirmed by the 
Senate, and who oversee and are responsible for the Armed 
Service~While it may well be thttt x subordinate military personnel 





activities here involved ~aR:a t8Q. Rff!:elit'\1 its in !he ea,tiHil se iB8ieate1, 
i 
there has been no showing whatever of res~eftsi:ble military authorities 
attempt ing to circumvent or frustrate the traditional s civilian 
control over the Armed Services of the United States. lft moy :k 
~the inferences and arguments to the contrary are quite 
u without support. Nor is the resolution of the issu¥ here 
,..,.~~ 
f .Hl¥elv9d. aided by attempting to place this case in the posture of 
1\ 
e-.~~ 
beiR:g lit e8fth 8¥6! sy between military and civilian control or as ,.. 
involving any conceivable threat of military usurpation. We have 
~ 
been blessed in this country, throug\its~ history, with 
a<-c•~•<Q 
unswerving ¥Pee8oe 88~g;tl'!ntt·:t~iol"Jll'l!T'i "t'07ff"'1tl1'ltrf!e!""'ee-o01tmtc~e8olfiL:~ ,{of complete subordination 
of the military to the civil government and authorities. If there 
has been unlawful conduct in this case the responsibility lies -
as they would be the first to acknowledge - with the Secretary 
of Defense and the Secretary of the Army. 
The Department of the Army operates under general 
directives from the Department of Defense with respect to 
4. 
intelligence activities within the United States. They pertain 
~e Bf'eaa areas: 
A 
(i) Personnel security investigations, for the purpose 
of determining whether civilian and military employees of the 
Army and employees of defense contractors can be granted access 
to classified information; 
(ii) Special investigations pertaining to l!8yHsliy 8sR8 
espionageJ~Pt," e~.~~{iian "'fnct military employees 
of the Army; and 
(iii) The gathering of information concerning activities 
which may affect the mission or security of the Army if called 
upon to deal with civil disturbances which are beyond the capability 
of state and local authorities to control. * 
*See affidavit of Thaddeus R. Beal, Under Secretary of the Army, 
Appendix 69; letter of Robert E. Jordan, Ill, general counsel 
to the Army, dated February 26, 1970, filed with respondent's 
affidavits, Appendix 51-55. 
5. 
a-c..~~~ 
These intelligence f~, most :X of which have been conducted 
• 
~ ~"""' for many years, are carried out by approximately 1, 000 agents 
"' 
assigned to the_3ntelligence ~ommand by the Department of the 
Army. In a document filed on behalf of respondents, it is stated 
~ 
that "94% of the time" of these agents ilK devoted to 88n:8ll&tiag 
"security investigations to determine whether uniform members 
of the army, civilian employees and contractors' employees 
should be granted access to classified information. "* 
This suggests that only » about 6% of the time of this unit was 
~~ 
devoted to the other intelligence missions, including counter-
:mtecxx intelligence with respect to "loyalty and espionage matters" 
. ~. 
d~Eie>l's. Translating these percentages of time into 
personnel, it appears that on the average there were about 60 
*See Appendix A to Speiser affidavit, letter of Robert 1IExxH 
Jurdan, general counsel to the Department of the Army, dated 
Feb. 26, 1970, Appendix 51, 52. 
6. 
"agents" devoting a part of their time to the questioned activity. 
This would mean :muvqm: 1. 2 agents per state for the 50 states. * 
4J....J....CL 
~ \~'"'~~. 
The type of surveillance activities alleged,.merit~~· 
The R~ complaint states that the information was acquired 
by "defendants' agents' surveillance of lawful and peaceful 
political activities, by anonymous informants, and through the 
use of photographic and electronic equipment. Other information 
. . . was obtained from local and state police departments and 
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. " ** 
*It is recognized, of course, that averages can be deceptive 
and no doubt in certain major cities, and at particular times, 
the efforts: devoted to this type of information gathering was 
substantially greater. Nevertheless, the~ quantative 
effort could hardly be characterized as "massive". Cf. 
dissenting of Mr. Justice Douglas, infra p. . 
**Complaint, ~8. It is interesting, if not unusual, that the 
factual allegations of the complaint are stated to be based upon 
a magazine article: "The information contained in the foregoing 
.. 'I. .. - 1 "1 .... 
7. 
The reference to "electronic equipment" apparently was 
to the use of taperecorders and similar devices at public rallies 
and meetings. There is no allegation in the complaint of the 
use of elect ronic surveillance (wiretapping and bugging) proscribed 
by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Act of 1968, which would have 
been unlawful without a prior court order. Both of the courts 
~~~.;~~~~~ 
below found tha~ tl~.Q tyJi'Q4UKfor;g;.laU.QR i8H88i8~ required no 
I-1.A.. ~~ .~ ~ -~ J. ;_~'1 
unlawful techniques, as li~ available to the public generally. 
The District Court found: 
" ... the army is keeping the type of information 
that is available to all news media in this country, 
covered by all news media in this country and which 
is in the morgues ilx of the newspapers of this 
country and magazines ... " Appendix 126. 
( ( ..... This finding of the trial judge was confirmed by the 
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals as follows: 
J 
"There is no evidence of illegal' unlawful 
surveillance activities. We arel~ited to any 
clandestined intrusion by a military agent. 
So far as it yet shown, the information gathered 
is nothing more than a good newspaper reporter 
would be able to gather by attendance at public 
meetings and the clippings of articles from 
publications available on any news stand."* 
*Tatum v. Laird, 444 F. 2d 947/ 
8. 
The method by which the information was disseminated 
within the Army corroborates these findings. Exhibit A to the 
complaint purports to be a copy of the intelligence unit's "weekly 
intelligence summary", addressed to its commanding officer 
but showing information copies to a number of military commands. 
The document is not classified, which means that it contained 
neither secret, confidential nor restricted material. It could 
have been delivered to any news reporter, and indeed the summary 
of "events" in this report could have been compiled largely from 
the daily press without attendance by agents at any of the meetings. 
The "system", as it is called by respondents, may have 
been a clumsy and unproductive effort. But obviously no one tried 
to conceal it. Indeed, the truth probably is that the surveillance 
.,4-0 
activity was so "low level" and - as it turned out -) relatively 
inconsequential, it did not come to the attention of the responsible 
military and civilian authorities. They were of course aware 
of the over-all intelligence mission, which inherently was an 
9. 
important one. But, as the action taken following the filing of the 
complaint indicate, those in authority just did not know how ineptly 
this element of the intelligence mission was being conducted. 
II 
But whatever may be said about the essential amateurishness 
of the operation) t is necessary - if this case is to be kept in focus -
to bear in mind (i) the relatively limited scope d what "the military" 
actually did, and (ii) the openness with which it was done. The 
question for decision, against this background, is whether the 
Department of Defense allowed this sytem to function in a way which 
infringed constitutional rights. I concur in the opinion of the Court 
that the complaint and affidavits submitted below do not show such 
an infringement. 
Respondents' position, essentially, is that the activity 
here challenged is unlawful altogether. The complainf avers 
that the information collected "serves no legitimate military 




administration by the defendants and their agents of the 
intelligence program described above, exceeds the lawful needs 
and authority of the United states Army and is without any lawful 
~ ;#.~ 
statutory authority. " aAdfue relief sought isj that the system 
"is unconstitutional" and should be :mpl:x permanently enjoined. 
~~~~~) 
In oral argumen~ counsel for respondents stated that the com-
plaint and affidavits "portray a system that we believe can only 
be considered disgraceful in the United states of America . . "* 
In respondents' brief, it is repeatedly stated that the Department 
of the Army has no constitutional power to conduct surveillance 
of domestic political activities. Moreoever, respondents' brief 
flatly asserts that "the statutes [io U.S. C. § § 331-334, relied 
upon by the governmeriJ empower the military to act only~ 
a particular insurrection has grown beyond the ~ 
. ' 
capabilities of the civilian police .... ** (••~~ ~ ~ld) 
*Appendix 12 5. 
**Respondents' Brief p. 68. 
11. 
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, as Imx 
read it, agrees with respondent that "military surveillance 
~ 
over civilian affairs" is not authorized by law. Indeed, ·~ 
. 1\ 
~/-c4M~I/~~ 
~draws a distinction between the "militia" and 
the Armed Forces and appears to conclude that (with the pos-
sible exception off'~tate of ~ "martial law')ie Q.sela:rs8, 
{he Al:med ~·~~ responsibility or authority~ a~~ 
'1-~~~ 
A respect to internal disorders or insurrections. 
With all respect, I disagree. The authority, indeed, the 
~ 
constitutional duty, of the Armed til8Fvj"fis is summarized in 
a letter of August 16, 1967, addressed by then Attorney General 
Ramsey Clark to the Governors of all of the states as follows: 
~ "At the President's request, I am writing 
you regarding the legal requirements for the use 
of Federal troops in case of severe domestic 
violence within your state. The requirements are 
simple. They arise from the Constitution. So 
the principles will be clearly in mind, I will briefly 
outline here the basic considerations of Federal 
law applicable to such a situation. 
"The underlying constitutional authority is 
the duty of the United States under Article IV, 
Sec. 4, to protect each of the states 'on Applica-






the Legislature cannot be convened) against 
domestic Violence. ' This pledge is implemented 
by Chapter 15 of Title 10, U.S. C. and particularly 
10 U. S.C. 331, which derives from an act of 
Congress passed in 1792. The history of the use 
of Federal forces at the request of governors in 
varied circumstances of local violence over more 
than a century is also instructive. "* 
Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution obligates the federal 
government to "guarantee to every state in this union a 
. -republican form of government" and to protect each state 
[upon request of the Legislature or Executive (~gainst domestic 
"!;>. ·-333 
violence." Sectio~ 331~of Title 10 U.S. C. implementl this 
obligation,by :!J;,.t;:;;{tfJ =~~ 
)\ ) 
federalize the national guard of "other states'and to "use such 
of the /rmed j orces as he considers necessari to suppress 
Nwi insurrections·. -,, 




is no express statutory authorization to collect intelligence 
information on actual or potential sources or leaders of domestic 
violence or disorder. The five essMtttal functions of military 
staff work traditionally have been operations, intelligence, 
personnel, logistics and supplyJand planning. There is no 
express statutory authorization for the,J'"med~ in 
~ 
preparation for a possible call to discharge .US constitutional 
duty, to engage in any of these essential military functions. 
~ 
Yef:;:A! w ~•H bm & th€Might teat the need for advance contigency 
A. 
planning and preparation - involving all of the five traditional 
~ ~ 
functions of military readiness and operations - ~e necessarily 
implied in the basic authority. Otherwise the authority itself 
would be meaningless1] The Court of Appeals e~llQssly 
recognized the "military need~ [for] certain intelligence 
information to perform their mission 'to enforce the laws of 
the United States' or 'suppress . . . insurrection. '" In 
amplifying this view, the majority opinion below said: 
, 
''In performing this type function the Army 
is essentially a police force or the back-up of a 
local police force. To quell disturbances or to 
prevent further disturbances the Army needs the 
same tools and, most importantly, the same 
information to which local police forces have access. 
Since the Army is sent into territory almost 
invariably unfamiliar to most soliders and their 
commanders, their need for information is likely 
to be greater than that of the hometown policeman. 
"No logical argument can be made for com-
pelling the military to use blind force. When force 
is employed it should be intelligently directed, and 
this depends upon having reliable information-
in time .... " 444 F. 2d 947, 
14. 
There can be no question as to the authority of the Army, 
or as to its duty, to prepare for its possible role in the event 
of serious domestic disorders by obtaining intelligence on the 
probable leadership of such disorders, the time and place, and 
the forces and techniques likely to be used. Without reliable 
information on these essential elements of information, the 
necessary contingency plans could not be developed. Indeed, 
the obtaining of accurate intelligence could forestall an over-
reaction or the employment of force when none was needed. 
The affidavits considered by the courts below abundantly 






the period primarily in question. Although the activity complained 
of began modestly in the summer of 1965, the possibility of serious 
and escalating civil disorder became a matter of high level concern 
following the Detroit rioting in July, 1967. This had been 
contained only after federal troopos were called into action at the 
request of the Governor of Michigan. * 
Following the Detroit disorders, then Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara created a special high level civil disturbance 
task force under the direction of the Under Secretary of the Army. 
This task force, which included both military and 1X civilian 
personnel, was assigned the responsibility of developing 
contingency plans and preparations, including the obtaining of 
necessary intelligence, for the possible need of further federal 
troop intervention at the request of a state. 
*Although federal troops had been used in connection with 
desegregation problems and the enforcement of federal court 
orders in Little Rock and elsewhere, such troops had not been 
used to assist local authorities in dealing with domestic disorder 
since 1943 when rioting in Detroit prompted the then Governor 







The wisdom, certainly for the short term, of establishing 
such a task force and of embarking upon the necessary planning, 
was demonstrated by the tragic events in April 1968, commencing 
with the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The 
affidavit of then Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher 
summarizes the role of the Department of Justice and the Army 
in dealing, cooperatively, with the serious civil disturbances 
which errupted in Washington, requiring activation and deployment 
of federal troops.* When viewed today in the relatively tranquility 
the 
of 1972, the need for such intervention of federal troops iry'future 
may seem remote. Yet, we have witnessed in R recent years 
unprecedented civil disorders and violence, with no one able 
to predict the extent to which it might assume epidemic 
proportions with grave threats to the domestic stability of 
the country. The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals 






"During the period 1967-1968 the national guard 
was called upon 83 times and the army four times 
16A. 
to quell cases of civil disorder. " 444 F. 2d 947, _. * 
In view of these circumstances the government would have 
been irresponsible indeed not to have taken all necessary precautions 
a 
to assure that, when called upon by /state, the army would have 
the capability of protecting the lives and property of our citizens. 
It had been demonstrated that civilian authorities alone, including 
the FBI and all available state forces, were inadequate to deal 
with the type of domestic violence which had profoundly shocked 
*According to one unofficial news report, in the month of April 
1968 alone there were 237 civil disorders, 27, 000 arrests, 43 
deaths, over 58 million dollars in property damage, and over 
58, 000 federal troops were employed to quell civil disturbances. 
U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 2, 1968, p. 68. Many of 
these disorders were relatively minor, but no one could be 
sure in the period 1965-1970 whether the major outbreaks of 
violence in Watts, Chicago, Newark, Detroit and Washington 





No challenge was advanced in those darker days against 
the authority of the Defense Department to take appropriate 
measures. But the authority plainly derives from the Constitution 
itself and by necessary inference from the statutes above cited. 
I conclude that the Army, under the direction and control of the 
duly designated civilian authorities, was authorized by law to 
conduct domestic intelligence gathering activities. Since 
respondents attack the validity of the system itself, and deny 
~~~ ~ ·~'il.c. 
\ tha hority exists, {conclude that they are not entitled 
to the injunctive relief which they seek. 





Nor do I find a basis in the com plaint for less sweeping 
relief than that desired against the entire system. There is no 
specific allegation of unlawful conduct. The averments of the 
complaint are limited to the following specifics: (i) the 
surveillance of lawful and peaceful political activities by Army 
agents who attend public meetings; (ii) the obtaining of information 
on political activities through anonymous informants; (iii) the 
obtaining of such information at public meetings through the use 
of photographic and electronic recording equipment, and from 
the files of the civilian police; (iv) the regular dissemination of 
this information on an unclassified basis; (v) the publication of 
a "blacklist", "believed to be an encyclopedia of profiles of 
individuals . . . who, in the opinion of its compilers, might 
(VJ) 
cause trouble for the :x Army;" and the storing of information 
1\ 
about political activities in data banks. These are the only hard 
averments in a complaint which is otherwise wholly conculsatory. 
~ Yet, none of these alleged activities is unlawful 
in itself. As the Circuit Court of Appeals found: "There is no 
evidence of illegal or unlawful KBX surveillance activities. " 
The essence of ~ respondents' position is 
that the totality of these lawful acts results in a'chilling" of 
speech and associational rights protected by the First Amendment. 
Again no specific instances of chilling - and certainly none of 
()A.A... 
outright infringement - .i,s. averred. The documents accompanying 
A 
the complaint show that respondents attended public meetings and 
continued to pursue their lawful political activities. We may 
surmise that some persons were deterred from attending meetings 
because of a reluctance to be photographed, 1:ElreK tape recorded 
or listed as having attended. This, however, is an inevitable 
risk of a free and open society. Anyone - whether private 
citizen, news reporter, policeman or government representative -
is IE rfectly free to photograph public gatherings, to list the 
names of persons in attendance and to maintain "morgues" or 
other records thereof. This is the daily grist of the American 
political mill. The truth is that few participants in political 
meetings, rallies or demonstrations desire privacy. One of the 
"i ~ ~~::s 
purposes is to attract publicity, stimulate interest, and carry 
1\ 
the "message" ta:tkx through the media and other publicity to an 
audience far wider than the immediate participants. Moreover, 
for one to develop position or stature as a leader in a protest 
movement or a "cause" of any kind, publicity is essential,. 
'J.v_~q.JZ ~_, (.;f 
,\ is avidly sought and if publicity were denied by state action, 
there would iH!hl!d be a constitutional issue. 
;$-u.:;l' 
~Athe complaint in this case avers no violation of 
~ law, and asserts no cause of action cognizable in the courts. 
It is well to remember that all grievances cannot be 
resolved by the judiciary. This case involves essentially a 
political problem. It can and is being addressed by the political 
branches of government. We know from the affidavits and 
' 
'•. 




documents filed that the BB: Department of Defense and the 
Department of the Army already have acted substantially to 
RHXiiadxl curtail, if not entirely to discontinue, the activities 
described in this complaint. Indeed, if the case were remanded 
it would probably be deemed mooted by this action. 
In addition, one or more Committees of the Congress 
are conducting extensive investigations to determine whether 
~ 
and to what extent the information gathering activities of the 
1\ 
Armed Forces should be curtailed or regulated by legislation. 
The political branches of government are far better equipped 
to deal wisely with this problem and to provide such future 
monitoring of these activities as may be requisite. 
In concluding, I add a personal w:r>rd: My conclusion 
that the complaint fails to state a cause of action justiciable 
in the <X courts implies no approval of the challenged conduct. 




authority and the duty - acting pursuant to civilian control and 
direction - to collect sufficient intelligence information to enable '. 
( ,, 
{-o~~ 
them to anticipate possible cabsA to prepare contingency plans ' ·' 
therefor, and to be able to act when necessary with efficiency 
and minimum force. 
,. ' 
Having said this, it is reasonably clear that the Army in 
~ 
discharging this duty acted neither with restraint nor appropriate 
" 
...... 
wisdom. There is an abhorrence among a free people to the 
presence at lawful meetings of government agents, however 
,,. 
innocuous their presence may be. Similarly, there is under-
standable resentment when the agents record names and faces) 
even though the media~nd anyone else present is p9PfeeM:y free ,,. 
to do likewise. Finally, as the information~ collected 
by the Army under the questioned "system" was readily available 
from other sources, it was little short of foolhearty for Army ., 
agents to conduct this amateurish operation. 
.-
Although the case is not one for the courts, the bringing 
of the suit may well have accomplished its purpose. This type 
of information gathering is not likely to occur again. 
